At the end of December 2024, Ronen Bergman, an intelligence analyst for the New York Times and Yideot Achronot, Israel’s leading daily, published a long expose about clandestine communications between the Assad Regime and Israel. Apparently, in the last few years, Israeli intelligence officers have been sending WhatsApp messages to the Syrian Minister of Defense. These included explanations about Israeli bombings inside Syria as well as threats for further actions should the Assad Regime continue to work with Hezbollah. Additional messages pointed out the existence of Palestinian guerilla organizations in Syria and the urgent need to halt their activity. These ominous missives, signed by a mysterious “Musa,” were transcribed by the Syrian military intelligence and distributed to high-ranking officials and were found by rebel forces after the fall of the Assad regime and published online.
An anonymous source in Israeli intelligence talked with Bergman and told him that a dedicated unit wrote these WhatsApp messages and that they were effective: the Syrian army followed the guidelines that “Musa” laid down. Allegedly, Israel was hoping to continue this secretive cooperation. The Israeli government wanted to begin talks with the Assad regime under Russian auspices. The idea was to use the weakening of Hezbollah following the assassination of its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, to offer Assad a new deal: dismantle your alliance with Iran, and Israel will help you remove American sanctions on your regime. But as Israel was making these elaborate preparations, Assad’s regime imploded.
Change in plans
All that to say, Israel had not foreseen the most important regional development since the October 7 attack and had been caught unaware. In response, the Israeli security establishment set in motion a contingency plan, “Operation Bashan Arrow,” which was probably written in 2011 when the Syrian civil war began. Consequently, Israeli land forces moved into the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, which has been demilitarized since 1974 following a ceasefire agreement. Crucially, Israel also took over the highest summit of Mount Hermon (9,232 ft above sea level). The aim was to allow Israeli intelligence to monitor better the Syrian-Lebanese border where much of the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah takes place, poising Israel to cut Hezbollah’s supply line. Additionally, Israeli units entered districts of the Syrian Golan Heights. Israel, presented its new deployment in Syria as “defensive” but did not make clear if or when it plans to withdraw to the internationally recognized border.
Equally dramatic was the extensive bombing campaign that destroyed military infrastructure throughout Syria. Both the Syrian Air Force and Navy were wiped out. Israel also obliterated the Syrian air defense, which was one of the best in the region. Proof for that was given in 2018 when Russian-made surface-to-air batteries deployed in Syria were able to down an Israeli F-16. Ever since the Israeli Air Force has been extra careful when flying over or near Syrian air space. However, that obstacle is gone. Israel now has a secure air corridor to Iraq and Iran. Previously, Israel needed elaborate planning and coordination with the US Air Force, as well as with friendly Arab countries, to attack Persian Gulf countries. From now on, Israel’s path will be smoother. It would surely inform the US before flying over this region, but permission is no longer needed. The first to grasp the implications were the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, which entered an agreement with the government in Baghdad to cease their drone attacks on Israel. This allowed them to avoid Israeli retribution. Likewise, Iran, mired in a debilitating energy crisis, seemed to have lost its appetite to confront Israel. Tehran knows that an Israeli operation to bomb nuclear facilities in Iran became much more likely.
Nevertheless, there are clouds on the horizon as well. As Israel’s veteran prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu observed, the fall of the Assad regime carries new risks.
New risks emerge
Nevertheless, there are clouds on the horizon as well. As Israel’s veteran prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu observed, the fall of the Assad regime carries new risks. The new regime in Damascus has started as a splinter group of the Islamic terror organization Al-Qaeda. For Israelis, the pictures of bearded warriors streaming out of the Idlib province in white pickup trucks brought back bitter memories of the October 7 attack that began in the same manner. ISIS forces are still active in Syria and may plan operations against Israel. Another major patron of HTS, Erdogan’s Turkey, has acrimonious relations with Israel. Recently, Ankara announced a total export and import ban against Israel to protest what the Turkish Trade Ministry called the "worsening humanitarian tragedy" in Gaza. In short, Israel is unsure about the intentions of the new Syrian regime. And while in the short-term, the fall of the Assad regime was a strategic boon for Jerusalem, in the long-term, the threat to Israel's security could increase. Indeed, only time will tell whether Israel's war against Hezbollah removed a Shiite terror group in Lebanon only to bring to power a former Sunni terror group in Syria.
The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.