## LOOKING AT IRAN

# How 20 Arab and Muslim Nations View Iran and Its Policies



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### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **BACKGROUND: 2006-2011**


All too often, discussions of the relationship between Iran and its Arab and non-Arab neighbors have been reduced to a competition between Sunni and Shia Islam. Sect does play a role, but as our surveys over the past decade make clear, the factors contributing to attitudes toward Iran are complex, including: reactions to U.S. and Israeli policies and how Arabs have compared their governments' and Iran's reactions to those policies; Iran's own behavior in the region; perceptions of Iran's ambitions; and issues of culture and heritage.

In 2006, for example, with the region inflamed by U.S. behaviors in Iraq and U.S. support for Israel's 2006 attack on Gaza and invasion of Lebanon, Arab attitudes toward the United States were at a low point. In contrast, Arab public sympathy with Hezbollah and, by extension, with Iran, was at a high point. If sect were the sole factor in determining Arab attitudes toward Iran, how does one explain the extraordinarily favorable ratings given to Hezbollah's leader and Iran's president in Saudi Arabia in 2008? In March of that year, when asked to name "the world leader you admire most (not from your country)," 21% of Saudis named Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, 13% named Syria's President Bashar al Assad, and 12% named Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

A few years later, Arab perceptions of Iran had changed. In our 2011 survey of Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, we noted a significant decline in the favorable ratings Arab opinion gave to Iran. Observing this, we conducted a more in-depth study in the same six countries and found in most of them real concern with Iran's policies in Iraq, Bahrain, and the Arab Gulf region. Only in Lebanon was there support for Iranian policy.

For each of the follow	wing questions, <sub>[</sub>	please indicate if	you think Iran pla	ays a positive or a	a negative role or	has no impact.
	Morocco	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE**
Iraq	14/72/14	13/61/21	38/35/13	20/56/8	14/81/4	/89/3
Lebanon	21/48/28	17/51/27	70/15/5	50/40/4	3/71/22	31/47/10
Bahrain	17/44/37	13/47/34	17/26/29	3/46/30	/100/	1/82/10
Arab Gulf region	15/53/29	17/50/29	28/32/23	2/33/38	1/84/10	<1/83/10
Positive/Negative/No	impact				**A	ll Arabs in UAE

Favorable/U	Favorable/Unfavorable Toward Iran: 2006, 2008. 2009 & 2011											
	Morocco	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE**						
2006	82/16	89/9		75/15	85/14	68/31						
2008	65/26	69/14	71/28	44/55	72/25	56/41						
2009	57/33	41/44	62/31	31/68	35/58	13/87						
2011	14/85	37/63	63/37	23/77	6/80	22/70						
						**All Arabs in UAE						



In that same 2011 survey, in contrast to the 2008 poll, only 4% of Saudis gave the Iranian president a favorable rating and only 5% supported Assad's role in Syria.

#### **ATTITUDES TODAY: 2012**

In an effort to learn more, this year we conducted our most extensive survey of attitudes toward Iran. In all, we covered 20 countries: 17 Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia) and three non-Arab countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan). The study covered four principal areas of inquiry:

- I. General Attitudes toward Iran and the Iranian Revolution
- II. Attitudes toward Iranian policies in several Arab countries and a comparison of Iran's regional role with that of other important international actors
- III. Attitudes toward the Iranian people, Iran's culture and its contributions to Islamic civilization
- IV. Attitudes toward Iran's nuclear program

Because the poll was so extensive and the data so rich, we divided the report into four regional groups:

- The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Yemen
- The Middle East: Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine
- The Maghreb, Egypt, and Sudan: Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan
- Non-Arab Muslim Neighbors: Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan

Because there is a measureable sectarian divide that can be observed in some, though not all, of these countries, we include a comparison of Sunni and Shia attitudes where they are relevant. Before examining the results, in detail, the following general observations can be made:

#### I. ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN

- 1. Iran is now viewed unfavorably in 14 of the 20 countries covered in this study. It is only viewed favorably in Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya. In countries where there is a measurable Shia community, there is a deep divide in views regarding Iran, except in Yemen and Lebanon where both Sunni and Shia have generally favorable views toward Iran, and in Azerbaijan, where both groups have largely negative views of Iran. (See Table 1.)
- 2. Does Iran provide a "good model" to follow? In only three countries do majorities say "yes": Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq. Pluralities in Kuwait and Bahrain concur, while majorities in 11 countries say "no," with the remaining four displaying mixed attitudes. By contrast, the UAE is considered a "good model" to follow by majorities or pluralities in 16 of the 19 countries (UAE excluded). Only Kuwait, Morocco, and Turkey disagree that the UAE is a "good model" to follow. (See Table 2.)
- 3. "Did the 1979 Iranian Revolution make the region more or less stable?" Most countries say "less stable" with only Lebanon and Iraq saying that revolutionary Iran contributed to making the region "more stable." (See Table 6.)
- 4. In the 2009 clashes between the government and the "Green Movement," only Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya side with the government of Iran. Opinion in the other 15 countries is decidedly on the side of the "Green Movement." (See Table 3.)

#### II. IRAN'S POLICIES

1. When asked specifically whether Iran is playing a positive or negative role in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and the Arab Gulf region – there is widespread agreement that Iran's role in each is negative. The only exceptions are Iraq and Lebanon, which are supportive of Iran's role

- in every area, and Jordan and Yemen which both give mixed reviews of Iran's role in Lebanon. (See Table 4.)
- 2. When asked whether "Iran is working to promote peace and stability in the region," only majorities in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya say "yes." Kuwaitis are divided in their attitudes along sectarian lines. In all of the other 15 countries, the answer is "no." (See Table 5.)
- 3. Majorities in every country with the exception of Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Algeria agree that Iran is contributing to sectarian division in the Arab World. (See Table 5.)

#### III. IRAN'S CULTURE AND CONTRIBUTION TO ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION

- 1. Are Iranians "good, religious people," "hardworking people," and "people like me"? Attitudes are negative in every area in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Palestine, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The negative views in Bahrain and Turkey show a deep sectarian divide, with Shia expressing significantly more favorable views about Iranian people than their Sunni compatriots. The only countries where overall attitudes are consistently positive are Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya. In the other eight countries, attitudes are largely mixed. (See Table 8.)
- 2. Has Iran made positive contributions to Islam? Only Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan answer "yes." (See Table 8.)
- 3. Which is more "generous" and "knowledgeable" Arab or Iranian culture? There is near consensus that Arab culture wins on both counts. The only exceptions to this consensus are Yemeni and Bahraini Shia. (See Table 10.)
- 4. Which culture is the more violent? Most countries surveyed say that the Iranians are more violent. The only country holding a different view is Libya. (See Table 10.)
- 5. Only Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria say that their countries have positive relations with Iran. Pakistanis and Palestinians are split on the question. And when asked if their country should have closer ties with Iran? In addition to majorities in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, about one half of Saudis and Bahrainis also agree. Majorities in the other 13 countries appear to be satisfied with the current cool relations with Iran. (See Table 8.)
- 6. Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf? Only Yemenis, Lebanese, and Iraqis agree with this proposition. In most countries there is a deep sectarian divide on this question. The only Shia communities to hold that Iran should not be a dominant power in the Gulf are the Shia in the UAE, Kuwait, and Azerbaijan. (See Table 12.)

#### IV. THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

- 1. Most countries agree that the Middle East would be more secure if it were a Nuclear Free Zone. The only countries that believe that the Middle East would be more secure if Iran had a nuclear weapon are Yemen and Libya. Iraqis and Algerians are divided on this issue. Only Shia in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, and Turkey say the Middle East would be more secure if Iran had a nuclear weapon. Shia Muslims in all other countries agree with their Sunni compatriots. (See Table 11.)
- 2. Almost all agree that the Arab Gulf region states are right to be concerned with Iran's nuclear program. Only Lebanese and Iraqis disagree. (See Table 12.)
- 3. Back in 2006, we surveyed opinion in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan asking whether they believed that Iran's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes or if it was intended to produce a nuclear weapon. At that point only Turks suspected that Iran had ambition to produce a weapon and Egyptians were divided on the question. Strong majorities in all the other countries believed that Iran's program was intended for peaceful purposes. In our current survey there has been a significant turnabout, with strong majorities in all of the above countries now believing that Iran has ambitions to produce a weapon. Of all of the new countries added to the survey, only Lebanon believes that Iran intends its program for peaceful purposes, with Libyans divided on the question. (See Table 13.)
- 4. What should the response be if Iran persists with its nuclear program? Majorities in every country except Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya support economic sanctions against Iran. There is no country in which a strong majority supports military action against Iran to stop its nuclear program. Pluralities in divided Turkey and Azerbaijan would support such military action. Palestinians are divided on this question. This opposition exists whether the military action is endorsed by a majority vote in the United Nations or taken unilaterally. The only subgroups to support military action are Sunnis in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Once again though, it is useful to consider the shifts in opinion that have occurred since 2006 on the matter of military action. (See Tables 14 and 15.)

Support	Support for military strikes if used against Iran's nuclear facilities and authorized by international consensus											
	UAE	KSA	Kuwait	Egypt	Morocco	Jordan	Pakistan	Turkey				
2006	5	6	3	15	14	0	11	27				
2012	29	36	17	39	26	34	29	51				

#### THE BOTTOM LINE

- 1. There is a growing antipathy toward Iran across the Arab World and among Iran's non-Arab neighbors.
- 2. Iran's unfavorable ratings appear to be driven by its policies in Iraq, Syria, the Arab Gulf region, in general, and by its nuclear program.
- 3. Most Arab Muslims, of all sects, see their Arab culture as superior to the culture of Iran. They see themselves as more generous and knowledgeable, less violent, and as having made a more significant contribution to Islamic civilization.
- 4. Iran has made serious inroads into the region's Shia population, especially in Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.
- 5. There is near consensus that the region should be a "nuclear free zone" and deep concern with Iran's nuclear program. There is strong support in most countries for internationally imposed sanctions to deter Iran's program. While majorities everywhere but Turkey oppose any military strikes against Iran should they continue to develop a nuclear capacity, the percentage of those who would support military strikes has increased since 2006, with a deep division among Sunni and Shia communities on this question. A majority of Sunnis in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan would support the military option.

## **POLL RESULTS**

#### 1. FAVORABLE/UNFAVORABLE

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen

For each of the follo	wing, please tell	us if your	attitude re <sub>{</sub>	garding th	iem is favo	orable or	unfavorab	le?
Table 1		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Iran	Favorable	50	42	16	27	15	32	80
ıran	Unfavorable	44	56	79	69	84	57	19
United Nations	Favorable	60	32	71	32	25	31	33
Officed Nations	Unfavorable	31	59	23	58	70	65	60
The United States	Favorable	49	30	64	28	62	37	34
The Officed States	Unfavorable	49	63	35	69	33	54	65
Russia	Favorable	47	43	51	50	11	43	44
Russia	Unfavorable	48	52	43	46	84	49	54
China	Favorable	32	43	45	54	56	38	52
Cnina	Unfavorable	61	50	51	42	39	54	45
F	Favorable	45	21	32	26	45	32	57
France	Unfavorable	48	71	62	68	50	59	42
TT-14-1TZ11	Favorable	45	27	39	39	44	35	56
United Kingdom	Unfavorable	48	63	54	55	51	61	43
C 1. A . 1.	Favorable	72	34	66	84	90	65	68
Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable	23	57	30	16	9	30	32
E4	Favorable	65	64	54	51	83	70	74
Egypt	Unfavorable	34	35	42	41	14	28	25
T1	Favorable	63	48	49	58	71	66	76
Turkey	Unfavorable	34	45	48	38	24	28	21
The Augh Leas	Favorable	62	32	63	37	31	39	51
The Arab League	Unfavorable	30	61	33	58	63	51	43
				_				

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

For each o	For each of the following, please tell us if your attitude regarding them is favorable or unfavorable?														
Table 1		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•					Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Imam	Fav.	32	72	4	76	13	21	67	0	92	6	25	47	73	94
Iran	Unfav.	63	21	94	23	83	74	28	99	6	89	70	39	27	5
United	Fav.	63	57	28	37	75	34	9	24	26	43	39	25	27	44
Nations	Unfav.	32	29	67	52	19	56	79	71	65	53	59	72	66	48

For each o	f the fol	llowing,	please te	ell us if yo	our attitu	de rega	rding t	hem i	s favora	able o	r unfavo	orable?			
Table 1		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia	KSA Sunni			Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
The	Fav.	53	43	29	31	68	31	6	72	6	43	39	34	25	48
United States	Unfav.	45	54	62	64	30	67	92	23	92	49	55	57	75	51
Russia	Fav.	45	49	55	33	50	47	77	7	34	46	51	40	35	59
Kussia	Unfav.	49	47	40	62	43	49	18	88	58	47	45	51	63	38
China	Fav.	28	37	50	36	45	51	85	56	55	50	47	31	50	55
Cilila	Unfav.	62	60	46	55	52	45	11	38	42	44	50	59	48	43
France	Fav.	44	45	18	24	31	25	37	46	39	43	23	29	52	67
France	Unfav.	52	42	76	66	63	69	56	49	57	51	67	62	48	33
United	Fav.	50	39	25	28	40	38	45	44	43	43	34	31	52	64
Kingdom	Unfav.	45	53	63	62	52	55	49	51	53	53	62	65	47	34
Saudi	Fav.	75	67	55	14	69	88	32	92	82	69	62	63	69	65
Arabia	Unfav.	21	27	43	71	27	11	66	7	17	31	35	29	31	34
Egypt	Fav.	65	65	69	59	56	50	69	90	48	77	74	66	71	79
Egypt	Unfav.	34	34	29	39	42	43	24	8	49	21	25	32	28	21
Turkey	Fav.	63	63	58	38	50	63	10	83	5	70	62	64	74	80
Turkey	Unfav.	34	33	37	54	48	34	90	11	93	27	30	29	21	20
The Arab	Fav.	32	72	4	76	67	38	34	0	92	49	51	32	55	46
League	Unfav.	63	21	94	23	30	58	62	99	6	45	41	56	39	49

Of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states surveyed, only Yemen (80%) and Kuwait (50%) have a majority with a favorable attitude toward **Iran**. Unfavorable attitudes are highest in Saudi Arabia (84%) and Qatar (79%). Across the Gulf, Shia attitudes toward Iran are dramatically more favorable than Sunni attitudes. In Yemen, both Shia (94%) and Sunni (73%) respondents have favorable views toward Iran.

The **United Nations** is only viewed favorably by majority of those in Qatar (71%) and Kuwait (60%), while less than one-third of respondents in all other Gulf region states surveyed have favorable attitudes toward the U.N. The **Arab League** is similarly favored by a majority of those in Qatar (63%) and Kuwait (62%), as well as Yemen (51%), while less than four in ten respondents in the other Gulf region countries have favorable attitudes of the Arab League.

More than six in ten respondents in Qatar (64%) and Saudi Arabia (62%) have favorable attitudes toward the **United States.** While opinion is evenly split in Kuwait (49% fav/49% unfav), solid majorities in all other Gulf region states surveyed have unfavorable attitudes toward the United States, including UAE (28% fav/69% unfav), Yemen (34% fav/65% unfav), Bahrain (30% fav/63% unfav), and Oman (37% fav/54% unfav). Attitudes of Sunni and Shia are not widely divergent in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. However, Yemeni Shia are twice as likely as Yemeni Sunni to view the U.S. favorably, while in Saudi Arabia and UAE, Sunni respondents are far more likely to view the U.S. favorably than Shia respondents.

At least two-thirds of respondents in the Gulf region countries surveyed have favorable opinions of **Saudi Arabia**, with the exception of Bahrain where just 34% of respondents say they have a favorable attitude regarding Saudi Arabia. The favorability ratings of Sunni and Shia respondents are fairly consistent except in UAE where 88% of Sunni and just 32% of Shia view Saudi Arabia favorably and in Bahrain where 55% of Sunni and just 14% of Shia view Saudi Arabia favorably.

A majority in all Gulf region states have favorable attitudes regarding **Egypt**, with the highest favorability rating in Saudi Arabia (83%) and the lowest in Qatar (54%) and UAE (51%). Again, these views are fairly even among Shia and Sunni respondents in most countries, though Saudi Sunni respondents are twice as likely as Shia respondents to view Egypt favorably (90% vs. 48%) while Sunni respondents in UAE are less likely than their Shia counterparts to view Egypt favorably (50% vs. 69%).

Majorities of respondents in Yemen (76%), Saudi Arabia (71%), Oman (66%), Kuwait (63%), and UAE (58%) view **Turkey** favorably. Opinion is evenly split in Bahrain (48% vs. 45%) and Qatar (49% vs. 48%). Sunni respondents are more likely to hold favorable attitudes regarding Turkey than Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia (83% vs. 5%), UAE (63% vs. 10%), and Bahrain (58% vs. 38%).

#### Group II -Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine

For each of the following, 1	please tell us if your	attitude regardi	ing them is j	favorable or ı	ınfavorable?
Table 1		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Tuon	Favorable	84	61	23	26
Iran	Unfavorable	16	36	74	70
United Nations	Favorable	39	28	41	35
United Nations	Unfavorable	61	65	54	59
The United States	Favorable	21	13	24	2
ine United States	Unfavorable	79	79	73	97
Descrip	Favorable	39	33	34	25
Russia	Unfavorable	60	61	62	69
Cl	Favorable	48	56	57	48
China	Unfavorable	51	37	38	48
Ename	Favorable	51	63	36	35
France	Unfavorable	47	35	57	63
United Vinedom	Favorable	21	10	31	10
United Kingdom	Unfavorable	78	85	65	83
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	34	54	81	74
Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable	65	43	15	23
E4	Favorable	55	69	76	78
Egypt	Unfavorable	44	29	20	19
Tuelcon	Favorable	49	41	68	83
Turkey	Unfavorable	50	55	27	11
The Augh League	Favorable	56	61	66	52
The Arab League	Unfavorable	40	33	32	41

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)** 

For each of the following	, please tell us i	f your attitu	ıde regardin	ig them is fav	orable or u	nfavorable?
Table 1		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
Iran	Favorable	75	96	81	15	82
Iran	Unfavorable	25	3	19	82	14
United Nations	Favorable	40	41	35	27	28
Officed Nations	Unfavorable	58	59	65	68	64
The United States	Favorable	22	17	22	6	16
The Officed States	Unfavorable	76	82	78	86	76
Russia	Favorable	35	45	36	21	39
Kussia	Unfavorable	65	51	64	75	53
China	Favorable	47	52	45	57	56
Cnina	Unfavorable	54	44	55	36	37
France	Favorable	45	52	56	57	65
Trance	Unfavorable	54	46	43	40	33
United Kingdom	Favorable	19	21	23	4	13
Office Kingdom	Unfavorable	79	78	77	92	81
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	40	30	33	90	37
Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable	59	69	66	8	60
Fount	Favorable	61	39	63	77	64
Egypt	Unfavorable	38	59	37	22	33
Turkey	Favorable	53	39	53	80	23
Turkey	Unfavorable	47	57	47	17	73
The Arab League	Favorable	61	51	57	58	63
The Arab League	Unfavorable	37	42	41	37	32

Among respondents in Lebanon and Iraq, strong majorities (84% and 61%, respectively) have favorable attitudes regarding **Iran**. The views of Lebanese respondents are somewhat divided based on sect, with Lebanese Shia being the most partial to Iran (96% favorable vs. 81% of Christians and 75% of Sunnis). Iraqis are more significantly split along sectarian lines, with 82% of Iraqi Shia having favorable opinions and 82% of Iraqi Sunnis having unfavorable opinions of Iran. Only about one-quarter of respondents in Palestine (26%) and Jordan (23%) have favorable attitudes toward Iran.

Attitudes regarding the **United States** are quite negative, with less than one-quarter of respondents in all four countries responding favorably, including just 2% of those in Palestine. The **United Kingdom** is also viewed unfavorably by strong majorities in all countries, with less than one-third holding favorable views.

**Saudi Arabia** is viewed favorably by 81% of those in Jordan, 74% of those in Palestine, 54% of those in Iraq, and just 34% of those in Lebanon. In Iraq, these views are decidedly split along sectarian lines with 90% of Iraqi Sunnis and 37% of Iraqi Shia having favorable attitudes regarding Saudi Arabia.

Majorities in all four countries have favorable attitudes toward **Egypt**, with more than three-quarters of those in Jordan (76%) and Palestine (78%) viewing Egypt favorably. **Turkey** is also seen favorably by strong majorities in Jordan (68%) and Palestine (83%), while slim majorities in Lebanon (50%) and Iraq (55%) have unfavorable attitudes regarding Turkey.

<u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

For each of the following,	please tell us if y	our attitud	e regardin	g them is	favorable	or unfavo	rable?
Table 1		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Iran	Favorable	44	58	61	31	34	38
Iran	Unfavorable	55	40	32	64	64	59
United Nations	Favorable	20	44	62	26	4	28
United Nations	Unfavorable	80	54	33	69	93	70
The United States	Favorable	13	44	47	19	10	24
The Office States	Unfavorable	87	52	45	77	87	75
Russia	Favorable	17	44	32	33	17	15
Kussia	Unfavorable	80	55	58	64	80	84
China	Favorable	28	58	33	53	58	63
Cillia	Unfavorable	69	35	62	42	40	36
France	Favorable	27	69	32	47	56	25
France	Unfavorable	73	30	61	49	42	74
United Kingdom	Favorable	22	50	22	22	63	49
Onited Kingdom	Unfavorable	77	48	73	75	36	50
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	56	76	78	55	94	82
Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable	43	24	13	38	6	17
Egypt	Favorable	59	65	87	74	95	72
Egypt	Unfavorable	41	34	10	22	5	27
Turkey	Favorable	48	80	34	78	89	64
Turkey	Unfavorable	48	16	58	19	9	36
The Arch League	Favorable	55	39	73	32	32	61
The Arab League	Unfavorable	44	55	18	60	66	38

Of the six North African countries surveyed, in just two, Algeria and Libya, majorities have favorable attitudes regarding **Iran** (58% and 61%, respectively). Favorable opinions of Iran are held by 44% of those in Morocco, 38% in Sudan, 34% in Egypt, and 31% in Tunisia.

There is a wide range of opinions on the **United Nations**, with Libyan respondents the most positive (62% favorable) and Egyptians the most negative (just 4% favorable).

Respondents in Libya and Algeria are the most favorable toward the **United States** (47% and 44%, respectively). Less than one quarter of respondents in the other North African nations surveyed view the United States favorably, including just 13% of Moroccans and 10% of Egyptians.

Egyptians are, however, the most favorable with regard to the **United Kingdom** (63%); Algerians and Sudanese are evenly split on the U.K. And just 22% of those in Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia have favorable attitudes regarding the United Kingdom.

Majorities in all six North African nations surveyed view **Saudi Arabia** favorably, most notably 94% of Egyptians and 82% of Sudanese. Morocco (56%) and Tunisia (55%) are the least enthusiastic about Saudi Arabia. **Egypt** is also viewed favorably by solid majorities in all six nations, including 87% of Libyans. Opinion is more mixed with respect to **Turkey**. While respondents in Egypt (89%), Algeria (80%), Tunisia (78%), and Sudan (64%) have generally favorable attitudes regarding Turkey, just 48% of Moroccan respondents and 34% of Libyan respondents concur.

Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan

For each of the follow	ing, please tell us if yo	ur attitude regard	ing them is favora	ıble or unfavorable?
Table 1		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Imam	Favorable	22	24	20
Iran	Unfavorable	77	71	75
United Nations	Favorable	33	51	26
United Nations	Unfavorable	66	43	70
The United States	Favorable	33	0	27
The United States	Unfavorable	66	94	66
Russia	Favorable	23	49	27
Kussia	Unfavorable	75	48	66
China	Favorable	58	51	60
Cnina	Unfavorable	40	45	33
<b></b>	Favorable	55	53	54
France	Unfavorable	44	40	39
TT -14 - 1 TZ* 1	Favorable	14	6	48
United Kingdom	Unfavorable	83	91	46
0 1: 4 1:	Favorable	69	92	79
Saudi Arabia	Unfavorable	30	5	18
T	Favorable	65	88	74
Egypt	Unfavorable	34	8	25
m 1	Favorable	98	73	82
Turkey	Unfavorable	2	23	17
771 4 1 7	Favorable	20	79	33
The Arab League	Unfavorable	76	12	58

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

For each of the fol	lowing, please tel	l us if your att	titude regard	ding them is fa	ıvorable or u	nfavorable?	
Table 1		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Iran	Favorable	12	92	10	94	1	28
11 411	Unfavorable	88	8	85	2	96	67
United Nations	Favorable	35	28	52	49	23	27
Officed Nations	Unfavorable	65	71	42	47	72	69
The United	Favorable	35	19	0	0	25	28
States	Unfavorable	63	78	94	95	69	66
Russia	Favorable	24	17	49	51	24	28
Kussia	Unfavorable	74	80	48	47	70	64
China	Favorable	59	54	51	49	62	59
Cillia	Unfavorable	38	45	44	46	31	34
France	Favorable	53	62	54	52	56	54
Trance	Unfavorable	45	36	40	41	38	39
United Kingdom	Favorable	16	7	5	10	50	47
Cinted Kingdom	Unfavorable	82	91	92	87	44	47
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	70	66	93	87	80	79
Saudi Alabia	Unfavorable	29	33	4	9	16	19
Egypt	Favorable	64	73	89	85	74	74
Едурі	Unfavorable	35	25	8	11	25	25
Turkey	Favorable	98	89	73	71	85	80
Turkey	Unfavorable	1	10	23	25	14	19
The Arab League	Favorable	20	18	80	77	25	36
The Arab League	Unfavorable	76	74	12	17	65	56

Less than one quarter of respondents in Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan view **Iran** favorably (24%, 22%, and 20%, respectively). There is a significant split on Iran between Sunni and Shia respondents in Pakistan (85% Sunni unfavorable vs. 94% Shia favorable) and in Turkey (88% Sunni unfavorable vs. 92% Shia favorable).

Opinions regarding the **United States** are abysmal. Just 33% of respondents in Turkey and 27% of respondents in Azerbaijan hold favorable attitudes regarding the United States, but not even one respondent in Pakistan views the United States favorably and 94% have unfavorable attitudes regarding the U.S. Attitudes toward the **United Kingdom** are also quite negative in Pakistan (6% favorable) and Turkey (14% favorable), but a plurality of respondents in Azerbaijan (48%) hold a favorable attitude regarding the U.K.

**Saudi Arabia, Egypt,** and **Turkey** are viewed positively by very strong majorities in Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan. Pakistan is the most favorable toward both Saudi Arabia (92%) and Egypt (88%).

#### **ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN**

When asked for the first word that comes to mind when they think of Iran, respondents in all countries are most likely to give responses related to Iranian policy issues, rather than cultural or religious responses. And, in most countries surveyed, there is a clear positive-negative divide between Shia and Sunni respondents.

Among the countries with significant Shia populations, sectarian division around top-of-mind policy issues are most prevalent in Saudi Arabia (Sunni: 71% negative vs. Shia: 53% positive), Pakistan (Sunni: 42% negative vs. Shia: 67% positive), Bahrain (Sunni: 49% negative vs. Shia: 37% positive), Kuwait (Sunni: 42% negative vs. Shia: 38% positive), and UAE (Sunni: 24% negative vs. Shia: 54% positive). For example, in Saudi Arabia, Sunni respondents say things like Iran seeks global conflict and wants to occupy other neighboring countries, while Shia respondents say Iran is a strong nation and shows courage in difficult situations. In Pakistan, Sunni respondents mention oppression and corruption, while Shia respondents talk about Iranian strength.

There is no sectarian divide on top-of-mind issues in Yemen and Lebanon, where such responses are generally positive and in Turkey and Azerbaijan, where responses are generally negative. In Yemen and Lebanon, majorities of Sunni and Shia respondents (Yemen: 56% and 83%; Lebanon: 56% and 65%) think of positive policy issues when they first think of Iran; for example, Iran is a superpower, has strong ties with Arab countries, and has strong defense forces. In Turkey, regardless of sect (44% Sunni and 40% Shia), responses about Iranian policy are quite negative including: Iran wants the nuclear weapons to control the whole world; pursue policy of abductions and massacres; and terrorist country. In Azerbaijan, Sunni (45%) and Shia (36%) respondents are more likely to view Iranian culture negatively, saying things like arrogance and paranoia.

In Iraq, Sunni respondents are generally negative with respect to Iranian culture (33%) noting, for example, a *lack of respect for others*; Iraqi Sunnis are divided on Iranian policy with 26% giving positive top-of-mind responses related to policy and 22% giving negative responses. A majority of Iraqi Shia respondents (53%), however, think of positive policy issues, like *working on building a strong nation*, when they first think of Iran.

Among countries with small Shia populations, a majority of respondents give negative top-of-mind responses related to policy, culture, and religion in all countries except Libya. The strongest negative views come from Tunisia (26% positive vs. 73% negative), Jordan (30% positive vs. 68% negative), and Palestine (32% positive vs. 65% negative). In Libya, 64% of respondents say something positive about Iran, including aspects of Iranian culture like *respect for self-determination* and *focus on technological development for progress*, while 35% say something negative.

#### 2. MODELS FOR DEVELOPMENT

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Models for develo	pment and progress that you	would like	to see you	r country	сору			
Table 2		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Oatau	Good model to follow	29	34	68	31	16	26	38
Qatar	Not a model to follow	53	49	5	53	61	53	35
UAE	Good model to follow	33	47	50	81	51	51	58
UAE	Not a model to follow	50	27	34	9	32	33	21
Egypt	Good model to follow	26	26	29	24	47	24	17
Egypt	Not a model to follow	59	50	46	46	22	49	49
Iran	Good model to follow	44	46	32	20	16	33	43
	Not a model to follow	31	35	48	56	67	41	42
Turkey	Good model to follow	37	44	44	45	57	48	32
Turkey	Not a model to follow	35	32	35	38	17	27	40

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

Models	for developm	ent and	progress	that you	would li	ke to se	e your	count	гу сору						
Table 2		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia	KSA Sunni			Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Ostan	Good	28	31	46	23	69	30	31	18	8	41	35	18	43	30
Qatar	Not good	55	51	32	65	5	53	51	60	67	40	42	62	31	40
LIAE	Good	31	36	53	40	51	80	82	50	59	62	56	45	53	66
UAE	Not good	52	47	33	22	33	9	11	33	28	26	24	37	24	17
F4	Good	26	26	27	25	29	25	23	48	45	29	32	21	14	20
Egypt	Not good	60	58	50	49	46	46	45	22	23	48	44	50	51	46
T	Good	17	79	19	72	30	17	56	1	96	11	27	44	28	69
Iran	Not good	55	0	64	8	51	60	22	80	0	64	36	30	53	24
T	Good	39	33	40	48	46	49	2	66	9	42	43	51	32	34
Turkey	Not good	30	40	36	28	35	33	90	11	49	35	35	21	40	40

A majority of respondents in Yemen (58%), Saudi Arabia (51%), Oman (51%), and Qatar (50%), as well as a strong plurality in Bahrain (47%), consider UAE as a good model for development and progress. Only in Kuwait is a majority opposed to seeing UAE as a model for their country (33% good vs. 50% not a good model).

A plurality of respondents in Kuwait (44%) and Bahrain (46%) consider Iran a good model for development and progress, with a deep sectarian divide evident in both countries (Kuwait: 17% Sunni vs. 79% Shia; Bahrain: 19% Sunni vs. 72% Shia). Opinion with respect to seeing Iran as a model in the other Gulf region states is either mixed (e.g., Yemen: 43% good vs. 42% not good) or negative, particularly in Saudi Arabia (16% good vs. 67% not good) and UAE (20% good vs. 56% not good).

Group II - Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine

Models for developm	ent and progress that you	would like to so	ee your coun	try copy	
Table 2		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Ooton	Good model to follow	80	88	57	57
Qatar	Not a model to follow	0	0	27	22
UAE	Good model to follow	81	51	67	69
UAE	Not a model to follow	0	4	16	21
Earmet	Good model to follow	62	59	45	59
Egypt	Not a model to follow	0	11	29	23
Iran	Good model to follow	77	71	38	32
Iran	Not a model to follow	5	14	38	54
Tradress	Good model to follow	73	63	60	70
Turkey	Not a model to follow	0	7	16	11

<u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Models for developm	ent and progress that you v	would like to	see your c	ountry copy		
Table 2		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
Oatan	Good model to follow	81	80	80	93	85
Qatar	Not a model to follow	0	0	0	0	0
UAE	Good model to follow	83	82	80	53	50
UAE	Not a model to follow	0	0	0	2	4
Earmt	Good model to follow	64	65	59	65	57
Egypt	Not a model to follow	0	0	0	9	11
Tuon	Good model to follow	66	89	77	31	89
Iran	Not a model to follow	7	3	6	43	0
Tuelcor	Good model to follow	74	72	73	76	57
Turkey	Not a model to follow	0	0	0	0	11

Majorities of Lebanese and Iraqi respondents consider Iran to be a good model for their countries (Lebanon: 77%, Iraq: 71%). While Lebanese opinion about the Iranian model is not divided by sect, Iraqi opinion is clearly divided with just 31% of Sunni respondents saying Iran is a good model compared with 89% of Shia respondents who think so.

Majorities of Lebanese and Iraqis view all the other options presented as good models for development and progress too. In Lebanon, UAE (81%) and Qatar (80%) are most favored. Iraqi respondents also view Qatar (88%) as a good model, though only a slim majority considers UAE a good model for their country (51%).

Views about good models for development are very similar in Jordan and Palestine; UAE and Turkey are the most favored models for both Jordanians (UAE: 67%, Turkey: 60%) and Palestinians (UAE: 69%, Turkey: 70%). Just 38% in Jordan and 32% in Palestine consider Iran a good model for their countries.

<u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

Models for deve	lopment and progress that yo	u would like t	o see your	country	сору		
Table 2		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Octor	Good model to follow	16	21	26	30	17	29
Qatar	Not a model to follow	67	52	59	47	50	45
UAE	Good model to follow	27	44	66	55	60	54
UAE	Not a model to follow	57	33	20	23	21	32
Egypt	Good model to follow	18	31	76	24	47	44
Egypt	Not a model to follow	54	46	12	50	21	35
Imam	Good model to follow	26	22	36	27	14	26
Iran	Not a model to follow	55	58	34	60	75	65
Thumbour	Good model to follow	67	43	45	63	49	72
Turkey	Not a model to follow	11	26	21	26	22	12

Majorities in all the North African countries surveyed, except Libya, feel Iran is not a good model for development and progress, with Egypt (75%) and Sudan (65%) the most opposed to an Iranian model. In Libya, 36% of respondents do consider Iran a good model, while 34% do not.

Majorities of respondents in Libya (66%), Egypt (60%), Tunisia (55%), and Sudan (54%) feel UAE is a good model for their country. A plurality in Algeria agrees (44%); however, 57% of Moroccan respondents say that UAE is not a good model for their country. In addition, majorities or pluralities in all North African countries consider Turkey a good model, including 72% of Sudanese, 67% of Moroccans, and 63% of Tunisians.

Egypt is only favored by a majority in Libya (76%) as a model for development and progress. There was little support for Qatar as a model, with less than one third of respondents saying it is a good model for their country.

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan** 

Models for develo	pment and progress that yo	u would like to se	e your country c	ору
Table 2		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Oatan	Good model to follow	6	68	19
Qatar	Not a model to follow	64	2	52
UAE	Good model to follow	9	86	55
UAE	Not a model to follow	80	1	25
Egypt	Good model to follow	6	83	30
Egypt	Not a model to follow	85	2	44
Iran	Good model to follow	11	72	6
Iran	Not a model to follow	82	11	89
Tuelcov	Good model to follow	83	79	44
Turkey	Not a model to follow	2	4	30

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Models for	development and progress tha	t you woul	ld like to	see your c	ountry co <sub>l</sub>	рy	
Table 2		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Ostan	Good model to follow	6	6	69	66	16	20
Qatar	Not a model to follow	65	62	2	3	56	51
UAE	Good model to follow	9	11	86	84	57	54
UAE	Not a model to follow	81	73	1	3	25	25
Earmt	Good model to follow	7	2	84	76	34	29
Egypt	Not a model to follow	85	89	2	5	40	45
Turan	Good model to follow	4	57	71	79	0	8
Iran	Not a model to follow	92	23	12	4	97	85
Totalease	Good model to follow	84	71	79	80	46	43
Turkey	Not a model to follow	1	12	5	4	25	32

Respondents in Turkey strongly reject any other country as a model for their development and progress. Pakistanis, on the other hand, find all the options presented as good models, including UAE (86%), Egypt (83%), Turkey (79%), and notably Iran (72%). Only UAE is considered a good model by a majority in Azerbaijan (55%), though 44% feel Turkey's model could be copied by their country.

#### 3. "GREEN MOVEMENT"

#### <u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?									
Table 3	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen		
More with the Government	22	38	15	16	26	26	72		
More with the "Green Movement"	70	53	73	68	62	61	25		

#### Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

~	During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?													
Table 3	Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni				Oman Sunni			Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
More with the Government	24	18	4	69	12	16	10	26	25	9	8	38	62	90
More with the "Green Movement"	69	73	87	21	78	69	57	62	64	81	80	47	34	9

Among the Gulf region states surveyed, only in Yemen does a majority (72%) identify more with the Iranian government than with the "Green Movement." More than two-thirds of respondents in Qatar (73%), Kuwait (70%), and UAE (68%) identify more with the "Green Movement" than the Iranian government.

#### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine**

During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?									
Table 3	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine					
More with the Government	83	58	17	24					
More with the "Green Movement"	16	36	70	67					

#### Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)

During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?												
Table 3	Table 3 Lebanon Lebanon Lebanon Iraq Iraq Sunni Shia Christian Sunni Shia											
More with the Government	74	92	82	26	73							
More with the "Green Movement"	22	8	18	67	21							

Lebanese respondents strongly identify with the Iranian government (83%) rather than the "Green Movement" (16%). A majority in Iraq also side with the government (58%); a clear sectarian divide is evident in these responses with 73% of Iraqi Shia respondents siding with the Iranian government compared with just 26% of Iraqi Sunni respondents who identify with the government. At least two-thirds of Jordanian (70%) and Palestinian (67%) respondents identify with the "Green Movement" rather than the Iranian government.

#### <u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?													
Table 3   Morocco Algeria   Libya   Tunisia   Egypt   Sudan													
More with the Government	More with the Government         33         55         57         24         31         31												
More with the "Green Movement"	51	43	33	62	65	56							

Majorities of respondents in Libya and Algeria identify more with the Iranian government than the "Green Movement"; in all other North African nations surveyed, less than one-third of respondents side with the government over the protesters in the Iranian Green Movement. The strongest identification with the protesters comes from Egypt (65%) and Tunisia (62%).

#### **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan**

, ,	During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?											
Table 3	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan									
More with the Government	29	23	26									
More with the "Green Movement"	62	71	65									

#### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)</u>

During the demonstrations that shook Iran following its 2009 presidential election, did you identify more with the government or with the "Green Movement"?												
Turkey Turkey Pakistan Pakistan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Sunni Shia Sunni Shia Sunni Shia												
More with the Government	29	33	12	81	16	30						
More with the "Green Movement"	62	63	81	16	71	63						

Less than three in ten respondents in Turkey (29%), Azerbaijan (26%), and Pakistan (23%) identify more with the Iranian government than the "Green Movement" in Iran. In Pakistan, there is a significant division between Sunni and Shia respondents on this question, with 81% of Shia respondents siding with the Iranian government and 81% of Sunni respondents identifying more with the Iranian Green Movement.

#### 4. IRAN'S ROLE

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Does Iran plays a po	ositive or negative i	role?						
Table 4		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Iwaa	Positive role	38	43	11	20	14	20	27
Iraq	Negative role	50	47	78	67	74	67	47
Lebanon	Positive role	36	45	20	27	13	32	43
Lebanon	Negative role	52	50	70	61	80	58	33
Cyrmia	Positive role	35	39	12	24	9	25	28
Syria	Negative role	51	53	81	69	81	64	46
Bahrain	Positive role	27	36	8	18	13	17	24
Danram	Negative role	59	46	74	68	81	62	37
Arab Gulf Region	Positive role	36	36	6	16	12	19	25
Arab Guil Region	Negative role	52	54	85	71	70	66	46

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

Does Iran	plays a positiv	e or neg	ative rol	e <b>?</b>											
Table 4		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia				Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Imag	Positive role	15	68	3	82	8	13	85	0	88	6	31	25	15	48
Iraq	Negative role	75	19	91	5	83	74	1	88	2	88	61	57	53	38
Lebanon	Positive role	23	53	4	84	16	22	84	1	79	11	57	38	32	63
Levalion	Negative role	71	28	93	9	75	67	3	94	1	83	35	50	40	24
Cronic	Positive role	18	57	4	73	9	18	87	0	57	8	25	33	22	39
Syria	Negative role	75	20	95	15	86	76	2	95	3	87	40	57	54	34
Bahrain	Positive role	9	50	2	68	4	11	84	0	82	5	28	21	25	24
Daillaill	Negative role	81	31	89	8	78	74	5	95	1	85	38	54	42	28
Arab Gulf	Positive role	10	69	2	68	2	10	77	0	77	4	23	27	22	30
Region	Negative role	83	12	96	16	91	77	9	83	1	87	51	58	47	43

Respondents in the Gulf region view Iran's role as negative in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and the Arab Gulf region. In each case, about 50% of respondents in Kuwait and Bahrain say Iran's role is negative, while about two-thirds of respondents in Oman and UAE see Iran as playing a negative role in each country and the region. Saudi and Qatari respondents are the most negative, with about three-quarters of these respondents saying Iran plays a negative role. Pluralities of Yemeni respondents agree that Iran's role is negative in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, and the Arab Gulf region; however, 43% of Yemeni respondents say Iran's role in Lebanon is positive (compared to 33% who say it is negative).

In every country except Oman and Yemen, there is a huge disparity between the opinions of Shia and Sunni respondents on these questions, with Shia respondents overwhelmingly viewing Iran's impact as positive and Sunni respondents overwhelmingly seeing it as negative.

**Group II - Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine** 

Does Iran plays a po	sitive or negative i	role?			
Table 4		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Iwaa	Positive role	75	64	19	19
Iraq	Negative role	19	30	64	72
Lebanon	Positive role	85	67	47	39
Lebanon	Negative role	14	25	48	56
Crruia	Positive role	72	54	13	17
Syria	Negative role	19	33	80	76
Bahrain	Positive role	70	56	12	14
Danram	Negative role	22	31	71	69
Anab Culf Dagion	Positive role	67	62	11	15
Arab Gulf Region	Negative role	17	29	80	75

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)** 

Does Iran plays a posi	tive or negative role?					
Table 4		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
Inaa	Positive role	65	86	74	9	90
Iraq	Negative role	29	9	19	89	1
Lebanon	Positive role	75	97	82	20	89
Lebanon	Negative role	23	1	17	67	5
Carmin	Positive role	57	91	69	8	76
Syria	Negative role	32	2	22	79	11
Bahrain	Positive role	55	88	66	8	79
Danrain	Negative role	36	4	26	77	10
Amah Culf Dagian	Positive role	54	84	65	10	87
Arab Gulf Region	Negative role	28	2	20	86	3

Perceptions of Iran's impact on individual countries tend to mirror respondents' overall favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward Iran. At least two-thirds of Lebanese respondents view Iran's impact as positive in Lebanon (85%), Iraq (75%), Syria (72%), Bahrain (70%), and the Arab Gulf region (67%), while less than two in ten feel Iran's impact is negative in these areas. Shia respondents in Lebanon are most likely to see Iran's impact as positive, but majorities of Sunni and Christians concur in all cases. In Iraq, about 60% of respondents view Iran's impact as positive in these regions, while about 30% consider it negative. These opinions are very lopsided with respect to sect, with Shia respondents overwhelmingly viewing Iran as positively impactful and Sunni respondents seeing Iran's impact as negative.

In Jordan and Palestine, views are quite different, with less than 20% seeing Iran's impact positively and more than 70% seeing it as negative, except with regard to Lebanon (Jordan: 47% positive vs. 48% negative; Palestine: 39% positive vs. 56% negative).

Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Does Iran plays a positi	ve or negative role?						
Table 4		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Ivaa	Positive role	33	19	13	17	18	21
Iraq	Negative role	51	49	50	68	62	61
Lebanon	Positive role	38	29	51	22	21	37
Lebanon	Negative role	45	46	14	60	51	40
Cymia	Positive role	17	17	9	16	12	10
Syria	Negative role	68	63	74	71	67	72
Bahrain	Positive role	16	25	8	15	20	11
Danram	Negative role	69	42	77	63	52	69
Arab Gulf Region	Positive role	12	23	9	12	3	12
Arab Guii Region	Negative role	67	56	73	60	57	71

In North Africa, respondents tend to view Iran's impact as negative; in fact, less than one quarter of respondents see Iran's impact as positive in almost all cases except with respect to Lebanon. In that case, 51% of Libyan respondents, 38% in Morocco, 37% in Sudan, and 29% in Algeria view Iran's impact as positive.

**Group IV - Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan** 

Does Iran plays a posi	tive or negative role?			
Table 4		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Luca	Positive role	12	19	12
Iraq	Negative role	62	67	69
Lebanon	Positive role	13	27	12
Lebanon	Negative role	53	58	58
Crusia	Positive role	9	18	6
Syria	Negative role	67	68	71
Bahrain	Positive role	16	17	12
Danram	Negative role	58	67	61
Anch Culf Decien	Positive role	8	19	6
Arab Gulf Region	Negative role	61	73	67

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Does Iran plays a positi	ive or negative role?						
Table 4		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Luca	Positive role	8	38	5	96	9	13
Iraq	Negative role	67	34	79	1	72	68
Lebanon	Positive role	7	51	15	92	6	14
Lebanon	Negative role	58	22	69	1	59	58
Correit	Positive role	5	32	4	91	3	8
Syria	Negative role	69	55	81	0	71	71
Bahrain	Positive role	15	24	5	80	8	14
Danram	Negative role	60	41	80	2	68	58
Anah Culf Dagian	Positive role	6	17	5	90	0	8
Arab Gulf Region	Negative role	62	50	87	0	76	63

Iran's impact is viewed as negative by wide margins in all cases by respondents in Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan. While both Sunni and Shia Azerbaijanis are in agreement, and Turkish respondents are only somewhat divided with respect to sect on these questions, there is a wide disparity between Sunni and Shia respondents in Pakistan on these questions, with Shia respondents overwhelmingly saying that Iran's impact is positive in all cases, and Sunni respondents saying the opposite.

#### 5. PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen

Agree or disagree with each of the fol	lowing staten	nents:						
Table 5		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Iwan is a wala modal for my country	Agree	34	36	12	29	15	33	55
Iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	53	58	78	62	84	57	44
Iran is working to promote peace	Agree	47	44	11	31	14	33	77
and stability in the region	Disagree	43	50	78	60	80	58	20
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to	Agree	73	64	74	60	89	64	66
serve its interests	Disagree	20	28	18	31	8	30	33
Iranian policy is contributing to	Agree	76	60	82	63	76	59	25
sectarian division in the Arab World	Disagree	21	34	13	30	21	34	73
Turkey contributes to peace and	Agree	60	49	55	64	73	65	78
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	32	43	38	34	23	31	21
Iran contributes to peace and sta-	Agree	51	47	12	23	15	33	61
bility in the Arab World	Disagree	40	49	76	71	83	57	38
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace	Agree	70	46	74	66	84	67	67
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	23	48	21	30	14	29	33
The United States contributes to	Agree	66	61	74	81	74	46	53
peace and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	31	37	22	17	24	48	47
Russia contributes to peace and	Agree	52	50	44	39	25	33	26
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	39	45	50	59	72	61	73

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

Agree or disagre	e with eac	ch of the	followin	ıg statem	ents:										
Table 5		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia				Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Iran is a role model for my	Agree	17	54	4	65	8	25	70	0	95	19	39	39	44	75
country	Disagree	69	33	93	26	82	66	26	99	4	69	44	53	55	24
Iran is work- ing to promote	Agree	19	82	1	83	7	26	82	2	82	8	57	42	69	90
peace and stability in the region	Disagree	71	6	96	9	82	64	8	93	10	87	31	48	27	7
Iran is pursu- ing its own	Agree	70	78	90	42	77	61	57	94	62	76	74	56	66	65
agenda to serve its interests	Disagree	22	17	6	47	16	31	33	4	31	18	19	37	32	35
Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian	Agree	76	75	95	29	87	67	18	89	2	83	75	45	33	11
division in the Arab World	Disagree	21	20	4	61	9	25	76	7	93	11	20	47	65	87

cont.

Agree or disagre	e with eac	h of the	followin	g statem	ents:										
Table 5		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Turkey contrib- utes to peace	Agree	69	49	56	42	56	69	13	85	8	67	68	64	78	77
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	23	43	38	49	36	29	84	10	91	29	27	33	20	22
Iran contrib- utes to peace	Agree	28	80	2	89	8	23	30	1	90	14	42	42	51	78
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	62	11	96	6	80	72	64	97	7	78	52	47	49	20
Saudi Arabia contributes	Agree	75	64	61	32	76	71	17	97	12	73	59	65	70	63
to peace and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	17	30	35	60	18	26	82	1	86	23	36	30	31	37
The United States contrib- utes to peace	Agree	78	51	79	43	76	82	82	85	17	78	81	25	47	63
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	21	44	18	56	21	17	18	13	82	20	16	67	53	37
Russia contrib- utes to peace	Agree	46	59	52	47	43	34	87	19	58	35	50	29	29	21
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	46	30	44	47	51	64	10	80	32	62	42	64	70	79

Majorities in all the Gulf region countries except Yemen say Iran is not a role model for their country, and that Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian division in the Arab World. At least three-quarters of respondents in Saudi Arabia and Qatar hold these views, the most adamant on these two points. In Yemen, however, 55% of respondents say Iran is a role model for their country and 73% disagree that Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian division in the Arab World. While significant sectarian divides are evident in Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia on these questions, there is considerably less division in Yemen, Oman, and Kuwait, particularly with respect to Iran's contribution to sectarian division.

Solid majorities in all countries say Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve its interests, with Saudis again holding the strongest opinion (89%), followed by Qatar (74%) and Kuwait (73%).

Majorities in Saudi Arabia (80%), Qatar (78%), UAE (60%), Oman (58%), and Bahrain (50%) say that Iran is not working to promote peace and stability in the region; opinion in Kuwait is split (47% vs. 43%), largely on sectarian lines with 82% of Shia respondents saying Iran is promoting peace and stability while 71% of Sunni respondents disagree.

By way of comparison, the United States is viewed as contributing to peace and stability in the Arab World by majorities in UAE (81%), Saudi Arabia (74%), Qatar (74%), Kuwait (66%), Bahrain (61%), and Yemen (53%), while Omani respondents are split on this question (46% vs. 48%). Majorities in all the Gulf region countries except Bahrain also see Saudi Arabia and Turkey as positively impacting peace and stability in the region. Views on Russia's contribution are mixed.

#### <u> Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following statemen	ts:				
Table 5		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Inon is a note model for my country	Agree	87	60	20	29
Iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	13	36	72	65
Iran is working to promote peace and stability in	Agree	79	63	19	25
the region	Disagree	17	33	75	69
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve its inter-	Agree	21	34	76	67
ests	Disagree	78	63	19	29
Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian division	Agree	17	34	78	72
in the Arab World	Disagree	81	63	20	26
Turkey contributes to peace and stability in the	Agree	52	49	74	88
Arab World	Disagree	46	48	19	10
Iran contributes to peace and stability in the Arab	Agree	81	63	23	23
World	Disagree	16	34	70	72
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in	Agree	35	55	87	81
the Arab World	Disagree	63	43	11	13
The United States contributes to peace and stability	Agree	34	40	83	65
in the Arab World	Disagree	64	56	13	31
Russia contributes to peace and stability in the	Agree	16	22	31	22
Arab World	Disagree	82	76	68	73

#### <u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following	ıσ statements:					
Table 5	2 conscinctives	Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
1 110	Agree	79	95	86	9	84
Iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	20	5	13	88	11
Iran is working to promote peace and	Agree	66	93	78	10	89
stability in the region	Disagree	30	3	19	88	7
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve	Agree	28	14	21	86	10
its interests	Disagree	72	82	79	11	88
Iranian policy is contributing to sectar-	Agree	26	8	17	87	9
ian division in the Arab World	Disagree	74	87	83	9	89
Turkey contributes to peace and stabil-	Agree	54	49	53	92	29
ity in the Arab World	Disagree	45	47	46	6	68
Iran contributes to peace and stability	Agree	73	91	78	10	88
in the Arab World	Disagree	23	5	19	90	8
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and	Agree	47	22	35	98	34
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	51	75	63	0	63
The United States contributes to peace	Agree	37	31	33	69	27
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	60	66	66	25	70
Russia contributes to peace and stability	Agree	16	15	16	4	31
in the Arab World	Disagree	80	83	82	94	68

About eight in ten respondents in Lebanon and six in ten respondents in Iraq feel that Iran is a role model for their country (Leb: 87%, Iraq: 60%) and that Iran is working to promote peace and stability in the region (Leb: 79%, Iraq: 63%). These respondents also do not believe that Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve its interests (Leb: 78%, Iraq: 63%), nor that Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian divide in the Arab World (Leb: 81%, Iraq: 63%). While in Iraq these views are deeply divided along sectarian lines, in Lebanon Sunni, Shia, and Christian respondents have remarkably similar opinions.

Opinions in Jordan and Palestine are exactly opposite to those in Lebanon and Iraq, with more than two-thirds of respondents in both countries disagreeing that Iran is a role model for their country (Jor: 72%, Pal: 65%) and that Iran is working for peace and stability (Jor: 75%, Pal: 69%), and agreeing that Iran is pursuing its own agenda (Jor: 76%, Pal: 67%) and that Iranian policy contributes to sectarian division (Jor: 78%, Pal: 72%).

Majorities in Jordan (83%) and Palestine (65%) believe that the United States contributes to peace and stability in the region, while majorities in Lebanon (64%) and Iraq (56%) disagree. Respondents in Jordan and Palestine also feel that Saudi Arabia and Turkey make a positive contribution to peace and stability; a majority in Iraq agrees with respect to Saudi Arabia, while a majority in Lebanon agrees with respect to Turkey. All four countries agree that Russia does not contribute to peace and stability in the Arab World.

Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Agree or disagree with each of the follow	ving statements:						
Table 5		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
I wan is a wala model for my country	Agree	41	37	47	20	21	29
Iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	59	61	49	72	77	68
Iran is working to promote peace and	Agree	44	39	64	23	23	33
stability in the region	Disagree	56	54	31	75	75	64
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to	Agree	58	71	36	83	85	64
serve its interests	Disagree	41	28	59	15	15	35
Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian division in the Arab World	Agree	58	41	79	70	67	63
	Disagree	41	56	17	26	33	36
Turkey contributes to peace and sta-	Agree	49	74	37	70	87	71
bility in the Arab World	Disagree	50	25	57	25	12	28
Iran contributes to peace and stability	Agree	43	40	63	21	25	34
in the Arab World	Disagree	53	58	32	73	75	61
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and	Agree	57	63	85	54	94	81
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	40	34	10	43	5	18
The United States contributes to	Agree	36	68	44	49	50	49
peace and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	63	30	52	48	49	49
Russia contributes to peace and sta-	Agree	18	28	16	29	18	13
bility in the Arab World	Disagree	82	69	79	66	80	85

Majorities of respondents in the North African nations surveyed are generally in agreement that Iran is not a role model for their country, that Iran is not working to promote peace and stability in the region, that Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve its interests, and that Iranian policy contributes to sectarian division in the Arab World. The only exceptions are that a majority of Libyans feel that Iran is in fact working to promote peace and stability (64%) and that Iran is not pursuing its own agenda for its own interests (59%). In addition, a majority of Algerian respondents (56%) do not agree that Iranian policy contributes to sectarian discord.

Opinions are mixed in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan with regard to the U.S. contribution to peace and stability in the region, while a majority in Algeria (68%) believes that the United States makes a positive contribution and a majority in Morocco disagrees (63%). All these countries agree that Saudi Arabia positively contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World and that Russia does not. Egypt (87%), Algeria (74%), Sudan (71%), and Tunisia (70%) feel Turkey makes a positive contribution, while Moroccans are split and Libyans disagree.

<u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following sta	atements:			
Table 5		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Inon is a nale medal for may country	Agree	8	20	9
Iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	90	75	89
Iran is working to promote peace and stabil-	Agree	16	23	13
ity in the region	Disagree	82	70	85
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to serve its	Agree	88	69	92
interests	Disagree	11	25	6
Iranian policy is contributing to sectarian	Agree	78	75	83
division in the Arab World	Disagree	20	18	15
Turkey contributes to peace and stability in	Agree	96	96	78
the Arab World	Disagree	1	0	20
Iran contributes to peace and stability in the	Agree	15	23	11
Arab World	Disagree	84	74	87
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and sta-	Agree	72	79	75
bility in the Arab World	Disagree	26	15	23
The United States contributes to peace and	Agree	15	79	59
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	84	18	39
Russia contributes to peace and stability in	Agree	15	14	20
the Arab World	Disagree	84	79	77

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Agree or disagree with each of the following statements:											
Table 5		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia				
Iran is a role model for my country	Agree	5	34	10	75	1	12				
iran is a role model for my country	Disagree	94	66	86	16	97	86				
Iran is working to promote peace and	Agree	6	77	8	98	1	18				
stability in the region	Disagree	92	19	84	0	97	80				

cont.

Agree or disagree with each of the follow	ing statemen	ts:					
Table 5	_	Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Iran is pursuing its own agenda to	Agree	91	69	81	12	99	90
serve its interests	Disagree	7	30	13	86	0	8
Iranian policy is contributing to sec-	Agree	86	33	87	14	95	79
tarian division in the Arab World	Disagree	12	63	11	57	3	20
Turkey contributes to peace and stabil-	Agree	98	91	96	94	82	76
ity in the Arab World	Disagree	0	4	0	0	17	22
Iran contributes to peace and stability	Agree	6	70	8	98	2	15
in the Arab World	Disagree	92	29	88	0	97	83
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and	Agree	74	65	79	80	77	74
stability in the Arab World	Disagree	25	34	15	19	21	24
The United States contributes to peace	Agree	14	26	79	80	65	57
and stability in the Arab World	Disagree	85	73	17	19	33	41
Russia contributes to peace and stabil-	Agree	16	9	14	14	18	21
ity in the Arab World	Disagree	83	90	79	82	78	76

Strong majorities in Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan disagree that Iran is a role model and that Iran is working to promote peace and stability, and agree that Iran is pursuing its own interests and agenda and that Iranian policy contributes to sectarian division.

They all strongly agree that Turkey and Saudi Arabia contribute to peace and stability in the Arab World, and that Russia does not. Opinion with respect to the United States' contribution is mixed, with Pakistan (79%) and Azerbaijan (59%) strongly agreeing that the U.S. makes a contribution and Turkey strongly disagreeing (84%).

#### 6. 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND REGIONAL STABILITY

#### <u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?									
Table 6	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen		
More Stable	20	23	12	18	11	19	26		
Less Stable	60	50	63	67	78	57	29		

#### Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Did the revolu	Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?													
Table 6	Kuwait Sunni		Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni		Oman Ibadi		Yemen Shia
More Stable	21	19	4	42	9	18	15	0	70	4	7	28	24	28
Less Stable	61	59	82	21	66	68	64	91	4	87	76	39	31	26

When asked about the impact of the 1979 Iranian Revolution on regional stability, a majority of respondents in all the Gulf region nations say it made the region less stable, except in Yemen, where opinion is split (26% more vs. 29% less stable). A sectarian divide in opinion is evident only in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

#### Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine

Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?									
Table 6	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine					
More Stable	72	57	14	15					
Less Stable	16	27	62	54					

#### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)**

Did the revolu	Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?									
Table 6	Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia					
More Stable	66	78	74	23	73					
Less Stable	19	13	16	60	11					

Majorities in Lebanon (72%) and Iraq (57%) think the Iranian Revolution of 1979 made the region more stable, while 62% in Jordan and 54% in Palestine say less stable. Opinions in Iraq are split according to sect, with 73% of Shia saying "more stable," and 60% of Sunni saying "less stable."

#### Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?									
Table 6	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan			
More Stable	32	21	7	15	13	14			
Less Stable	38	39	75	49	44	48			

While only in Libya does a majority (75%) say the revolution of 1979 made the region less stable, solid pluralities in Tunisia (49%), Sudan (48%), Egypt (44%), Algeria (39%), and Morocco (38%) concur.

#### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?							
Table 6	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan				
More Stable	9	19	11				
Less Stable	63	26	45				

#### **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)**

Did the revolution in Iran in 1979 make the region more or less stable?							
Table 6	Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia	
More Stable	5	31	10	61	8	13	
Less Stable	69	24	26	25	49	43	

A majority in Turkey (63%) as well as pluralities in Azerbaijan (45%) and Pakistan (26%) say that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 made the region less stable. Shia respondents in Pakistan (61%) and Turkey (31%), however, feel that the region is more stable because of the revolution.

## 7. SECTARIAN DIVISION

## Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen

How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?												
Table 7KuwaitBahrainQatarUAEKSAOmanYemen												
Concerned	75	74	78	65	82	68	85					
Not concerned	22	20	16	25	14	24	15					

#### Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

How concerned	How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?													
Table 7	Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni			Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Concerned	75	76	90	60	81	65	68	82	85	77	80	62	85	86
Not concerned	23	22	6	31	13	25	22	14	12	14	9	32	16	15

## **Group II - Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine**

How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?										
Table 7   Lebanon   Iraq   Jordan   Palestine										
Concerned	100	97	87	89						
Not concerned	0	0	9	9						

### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)**

How concerned a	How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?											
Table 7	Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia							
Concerned	100	100	100	97	98							
Not concerned	0	0	0	0	0							

## Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?										
Table 7	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan				
Concerned	69	86	91	72	83	86				
Not concerned	30	13	2	25	15	12				

### **Group IV - Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan**

How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?									
Table 7   Turkey   Pakistan   Azerbaijan									
Concerned	83	100	79						
Not concerned	12	0	18						

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

How concerned are	How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?											
Table 7TurkeyTurkeyPakistanPakistanAzerbaijanAzerbaijanSunniShiaSunniShiaSunniShia												
Concerned	85	65	100	100	77	80						
Not concerned	9	31	0	0	19	17						

In all 20 countries surveyed, strong majorities – to unanimity in some cases – are concerned that sectarian division is growing across the region.

Among Gulf and Arabian Peninsula nations, Yemen (85%) and Saudi Arabia (82%) express the most concern, with Oman (68%) and UAE (65%) conveying the least, though still substantial, concern. There is unanimous concern in Lebanon and near unanimity in Iraq (97%), Palestine (89%), and Jordan (87%). In North Africa, more than two-thirds of respondents express concern over sectarian division in the region, with the most concern conveyed in Libya (91%), Algeria (86%), Sudan (86%), and Egypt (83%). Finally, there is unanimous concern in Pakistan and very high levels of concern in Turkey (83%) and Azerbaijan (79%).

# 8. RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN AND ITS PEOPLE

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the fol	lowing statem	ents:						
Table 8		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Most Iranians are good, religious	Agree	47	41	27	34	39	45	76
people	Disagree	47	52	66	62	59	50	22
Iwaniana aya hayd wayking naanla	Agree	50	42	47	53	44	48	78
Iranians are hard-working people	Disagree	42	49	49	43	53	44	20
Imaniana ava naonla ivet lika ma	Agree	56	40	37	56	28	52	37
Iranians are people just like me	Disagree	38	52	60	37	70	39	62
Iranians have made a positive con-	Agree	22	37	10	16	24	27	31
tribution to Islam	Disagree	71	61	87	75	74	68	67
Are relations between your country	Positive	29	13	10	39	0	32	88
and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	62	83	81	57	97	60	10
Should your country have closer	Agree	41	47	23	41	50	39	79
ties with Iran?	Disagree	52	46	69	55	44	55	20

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Agree or disagree	e with eacl	h of the j	following	g stateme	nts:										
Table 8		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni			KSA Shia	Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Most Iranians are good, reli-	Agree	48	45	10	69	23	33	34	40	34	32	35	53	67	92
gious people	Disagree	46	47	80	27	70	62	62	58	64	65	59	41	31	7
Iranians are hard-working	Agree	52	47	15	66	45	52	61	44	45	38	44	53	70	93
people	Disagree	41	42	75	26	51	44	33	53	52	54	55	37	28	7
Iranians are people just like	Agree	55	57	10	67	35	57	54	28	26	54	48	51	31	46
me people just like	Disagree	37	38	83	24	63	38	37	70	72	40	48	38	66	55
Iranians have made a positive	Agree	20	25	4	66	6	15	15	25	17	11	16	36	26	40
contribution to Islam	Disagree	72	70	95	31	92	75	75	73	79	83	78	59	72	59
Are relations between your country and	Positive	29	30	3	19	9	40	34	0	0	38	33	29	84	95
Iran positive or negative?	Negative	62	62	96	74	82	57	61	97	97	54	60	63	14	5
Should your country have	Agree	41	41	12	80	18	39	74	41	99	32	36	43	71	94
closer ties with Iran?	Disagree	52	52	82	12	73	58	24	52	0	64	62	49	29	5

When asked if Iranians are "good, religious people," "hard-working people," and "people just like me," respondents in Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are negative on all three questions, with 70% of Saudis disagreeing that "Iranians are people just like me" and 66% of Qataris disagreeing that "Iranians are good, religious people." In Bahrain, these negative views are highly correlated with Sunni respondents, while Shia respondents tend to express far more favorable views of the Iranian people.

A majority of Yemeni respondents (76%) say "Iranians are good, religious people," while majorities of respondents in UAE (62%) and Oman (50%) disagree, and opinion in Kuwait is evenly split. All four of these countries, however, agree that "Iranians are hard-working people" (Yemen: 78%, UAE: 53%, Kuwait: 50%, Oman: 48%). Respondents in Kuwait (56%), UAE (56%), and Oman (52%) also agree that "Iranians are people just like me," while 62% of Yemeni respondents disagree.

At least six in ten respondents in all the Gulf region states say that Iranians have not made a positive contribution to Islam, with Qataris expressing the strongest opinion (87%).

Majorities in all the Gulf region countries, except Yemen, say that the relations between their country and Iran are negative, including 97% in Saudi Arabia, 83% in Bahrain, and 81% in Qatar. In Yemen, 88% of respondents say their country has positive relations with Iran.

Opinions on whether or not their countries should have closer ties with Iran are decidedly mixed. Majorities in Qatar (69%), Oman (55%), UAE (55%), and Kuwait (52%) say "no," while a majority in Yemen (79%) and Saudi Arabia (50%) say "yes," and Bahrainis are evenly split along sectarian lines. While there is an obvious split among Sunni and Shia respondents in UAE and Saudi Arabia on this question, it is significant that 41% of Saudi and 39% of UAE Sunni respondents believe their countries should have closer ties with Iran.

<u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine</u>

Agree or disagree with each of t	he following	statements:			
Table 8		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Most Iranians are good,	Agree	52	70	23	32
religious people	Disagree	47	28	68	63
Iranians are hard-working	Agree	80	82	35	35
people	Disagree	19	15	59	57
Iranians are people just	Agree	74	89	55	41
like me	Disagree	26	8	41	51
Iranians have made a positive	Agree	83	89	29	21
contribution to Islam	Disagree	16	8	65	75
Are relations between your	Positive	97	92	11	48
country and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	2	7	83	46
Should your country have	Agree	82	66	26	23
closer ties with Iran?	Disagree	17	32	67	70

Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)

Agree or disagree with each of the fo	llowing stat	tements:				
Table 8		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
Most Iranians are good, religious	Agree	54	53	51	63	73
people	Disagree	46	47	48	35	24
Iranians are hard-working people	Agree	77	82	80	85	81
iranians are nard-working people	Disagree	22	17	18	12	16
Inquiana ana maanla inat lika ma	Agree	76	75	71	83	92
Iranians are people just like me	Disagree	23	24	29	15	6
Iranians have made a positive	Agree	80	88	83	84	91
contribution to Islam	Disagree	20	13	16	14	5
Are relations between your coun-	Positive	98	98	97	83	95
try and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	2	2	2	16	2
Should your country have closer	Agree	74	92	81	16	90
ties with Iran?	Disagree	25	8	18	82	8

Majorities of respondents in Lebanon and Iraq agree that "Iranians are good, religious people" (52% and 70%, respectively), "hard-working" (80% and 82%), and "people just like me" (74% and 89%), while majorities of respondents in Jordan and Palestine disagree that "Iranians are good, religious people" (68% and 63%) and "hard-working" (59% and 57%). Jordanians and Palestinians are split, however, on Iranians being "people just like me" with 55% in Jordan agreeing and 51% of those in Palestine disagreeing.

Those in Lebanon and Iraq also say that "Iranians have made a positive contribution to Islam" (83% and 89%, respectively), while majorities in Jordan (65%) and Palestine (75%) disagree.

In terms of relations with Iran, respondents in Lebanon and Iraq are almost unanimous in saying that their relations are positive; and in both countries majorities say they should have even closer ties (Leb: 82%, Iraq: 66%). In Jordan, 83% of respondents say they have negative relations with Iran, and just 26% think Jordan should have closer ties with Iran. In Palestine, opinion is somewhat more mixed with 48% saying their relations with Iran are positive and 46% saying negative; still, 70% do not want closer ties with Iran.

<u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following statements:											
Table 8		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan				
Most Iranians are good, religious	Agree	42	61	63	31	38	33				
people	Disagree	58	39	32	65	60	67				
Iranians are hard-working people	Agree	29	76	65	46	52	38				
Tranians are nard-working people	Disagree	70	22	31	47	46	58				
Inomiano ano moonlo ivot libro mo	Agree	27	33	57	27	22	33				
Iranians are people just like me	Disagree	72	65	36	68	77	67				

cont.

Agree or disagree with each of the following statements:													
Table 8		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan						
Iranians have made a positive	Agree	42	24	58	15	13	36						
contribution to Islam	Disagree	57	74	36	81	85	60						
Are relations between your coun-	Positive	38	80	76	26	23	33						
try and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	61	19	19	69	74	66						
Should your country have closer	Agree	43	58	63	36	40	38						
ties with Iran?	Disagree	56	41	31	61	59	60						

Respondents in Libya are positive across the board, saying "Iranians are good, religious people" (63%), "hardworking" (65%), and "people just like me" (57%). Algerian respondents agree that Iranians are "good, religious people" (61%) and "hard-working" (76%), but two-thirds disagree that Iranians are "people just like me." The only other positive response is from a majority in Egypt who agree that Iranians are "hard-working" (52%). Majorities in Morocco and Sudan respond negatively to all three questions. Tunisians are negative with respect to Iranians being "good, religious people" and "people just like me," but are split on how "hard-working" Iranians are.

Majorities in all North African nations except Libya do not think that "Iranians have made a positive contribution to Islam."

More than three-quarters of respondents in Libya and Algeria say the relations between their country and Iran is positive, and strong majorities (63% and 58%, respectively) want to have closer ties with Iran. Meanwhile majorities in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan say their relations with Iran are negative, and do not want their countries to have closer ties to Iran.

<u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the follow	ving statemen	ts:		
Table 8		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Most Iranians are good, religious	Agree	21	45	21
people	Disagree	75	49	76
Inoniana and hand wonlying month	Agree	25	64	30
Iranians are hard-working people	Disagree	72	31	68
Inquiana ana magala ivat lilea ma	Agree	18	94	13
Iranians are people just like me	Disagree	78	0	85
Iranians have made a positive contri-	Agree	18	51	7
bution to Islam	Disagree	78	43	91
Are relations between your country	Positive	0	46	1
and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	95	48	97
Should your country have closer ties	Agree	21	26	23
with Iran?	Disagree	74	71	75

Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)

Agree or disagree with each of the follo	wing statements:						
Table 8		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Most Iranians are good, religious	Agree	13	71	44	46	8	26
people	Disagree	83	25	48	53	90	71
Imaniana and hand vyoulring magnle	Agree	17	73	64	63	16	35
Iranians are hard-working people	Disagree	79	25	32	27	81	63
Inquiana ano magnia ivat lika ma	Agree	11	63	94	94	6	16
Iranians are people just like me	Disagree	84	34	0	0	93	82
Iranians have made a positive contri-	Agree	11	63	49	61	1	9
bution to Islam	Disagree	85	34	44	35	96	89
Are relations between your country	Positive	0	2	46	50	1	1
and Iran positive or negative?	Negative	95	93	49	43	96	98
Should your country have closer ties	Agree	13	71	15	84	8	29
with Iran?	Disagree	81	25	82	15	90	69

In Turkey and Azerbaijan, majorities disagree that "Iranians are good, religious people" (75% and 76%, respectively), "hard-working" (72% and 68%), and "people just like me" (78% and 85%). Pakistani respondents are far more positive with 94% saying "Iranians are people just like me" and 64% saying they are "hardworking"; Pakistanis are split on whether Iranians are "good, religious people" (45% agree vs. 49% disagree). While there is no significant sectarian divide in Pakistan or Azerbaijan on these questions, Sunni respondents in Turkey are extremely negative on these questions, while Shia respondents are far more favorable to the Iranian people.

A majority of Pakistani respondents (51%) say "Iranians have made a positive contribution to Islam," while 91% of Azerbaijanis and 78% of Turks disagree.

There is near unanimity among respondents in Turkey (95%) and Azerbaijan (97%) that the relations between their countries and Iran are negative, while Pakistanis are evenly split on this question (46% positive vs. 48% negative). More than seven in ten respondents in all three non-Arab Muslim neighbors do not want closer ties with Iran. In Pakistan, Shia respondents overwhelmingly (84%) would like to have closer ties, while Sunni respondents strongly disagree (82%).

## 9. THE CULTURE OF YOUR COUNTRY VERSUS THE CULTURE OF IRAN

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?												
Table 9	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen					
<b>Equal to Iranian culture</b>	15	19	16	13	16	20	35					
Superior	73	54	66	66	70	60	26					
Inferior	5	18	13	15	12	13	38					

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

What are	What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?													
Table 9	Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	Qatar Sunni	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia	KSA Sunni	_	Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Equal	14	17	11	26	16	14	13	17	11	11	10	27	32	40
Superior	80	65	80	30	69	66	67	68	82	80	76	47	31	16
Inferior	1	11	4	30	12	15	13	13	4	6	11	17	34	44

In all Gulf region countries except Yemen, majorities of respondents say that the culture of their country is superior to the culture of Iran; Kuwait (73%) and Saudi Arabia (70%) have the highest "superior" rating. Only about one-quarter of Yemeni respondents say their country is superior, while 38% say Iran's culture is superior to Yemen's, and 35% say the two are equal.

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine** 

What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?											
Table 9	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine							
Equal to Iranian culture	30	37	20	19							
Superior	54	60	69	70							
Inferior	14	0	7	6							

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)** 

What are y	What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?												
Table 9	Table 9         Lebanon Sunni         Lebanon Shia         Lebanon Christian         Iraq Sunni         Iraq Shia												
Equal	28	33	28	35	39								
Superior	55	50	56	62	59								
Inferior	14	16	13	0	0								

Respondents in Palestine (70%), Jordan (69%), Iraq (60%), and Lebanon (54%) feel that their country's culture is superior to the culture of Iran.

Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?												
Table 9	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan						
Equal to Iranian culture	16	32	41	18	21	19						
Superior	70	40	44	68	65	66						
Inferior	13	28	10	10	12	13						

While majorities in Morocco (70%), Tunisia (68%), Sudan (66%), and Egypt (65%) say their country's culture is superior to Iran's culture, only pluralities of respondents in Libya (44%) and Algeria (40%) say the same.

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan** 

What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?											
Table 9	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan								
<b>Equal to Iranian culture</b>	9	32	14								
Superior	76	55	77								
Inferior	8	8	6								

### **Group IV - Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)**

What are your opinions about the culture of your country versus the culture of Iran?												
Table 9	Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia						
Equal	8	16	33	27	10	15						
Superior	83	38	54	56	87	73						
Inferior	3	38	8	3	1	8						

Respondents in Azerbaijan (77%), Turkey (76%), and Pakistan (55%) believe that their culture is superior to Iran's culture.

## 10. COMPARING ARAB AND IRANIAN CULTURE

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Compare Arab culture with 1	ranian culture in the following way	ys:						
Table 10		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
	Arab Culture	54	62	63	72	80	67	69
Which is more generous?	Iranian Culture	33	25	22	14	7	19	11
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	12	9	9	7	12	9	18
	Arab Culture	27	17	10	9	7	12	14
Which is more violent?	Iranian Culture	59	65	77	79	81	71	69
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	9	10	7	8	10	11	16
*.**. 1 1 1 1	Arab Culture	54	50	63	57	66	58	43
Which is more knowledge- able?	Iranian Culture	27	30	22	23	18	22	40
abic:	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	13	13	9	11	13	12	17
Y.71 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1	Arab Culture	47	41	54	44	64	57	71
Which is more grounded in history and civilization?	Iranian Culture	36	39	27	33	20	27	17
Arab & Iranian culture are e		11	14	12	11	11	9	11

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

Compare Arab c	ulture wi	ith Irani	an cultu	re in the	followin	g ways	:								
Table 10		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia	KSA Sunni		Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
TATE . 1 .	Arab	50	58	88	38	67	73	71	80	79	72	69	63	71	65
Which is more generous?	Iranian	35	30	5	42	20	13	12	7	7	16	19	21	11	11
generous.	Equal	14	9	5	13	8	7	6	12	11	8	8	10	16	23
TATE . 1 .	Arab	12	47	2	30	7	9	7	7	8	5	5	17	13	15
Which is more violent?	Iranian	78	36	92	41	81	79	82	81	87	89	85	59	69	69
violent.	Equal	7	12	4	16	6	8	7	11	6	5	8	14	17	16
****** 1 ·	Arab	54	54	66	37	66	57	54	67	62	66	62	54	52	27
Which is more knowledgeable?	Iranian	28	25	20	39	21	23	26	18	19	16	24	25	31	54
knowieugeable.	Equal	12	14	9	17	7	11	8	13	15	9	7	14	15	19
Which is more	Arab	59	33	54	29	55	44	39	64	62	55	60	57	74	66
grounded in	Iranian	25	51	31	47	27	33	37	21	19	30	23	26	14	22
history and civilization?	Equal	12	10	9	17	12	11	14	11	12	9	9	9	11	11

All the Gulf region nations agree by wide margins that Arab culture is more generous than Iranian culture. Majorities in all countries also agree that Arab culture is more knowledgeable, except in Yemen where 43% say Arab culture is more knowledgeable and 40% say Iranian culture is. In both Yemen and Bahrain, Shia respondents are more likely to say Iranian culture is more knowledgeable (54% and 39%, respectively) than to say Arab culture is (27% and 37%, respectively).

Majorities in Yemen (71%), Saudi Arabia (64%), Oman (57%), and Qatar (54%) say that Arab culture is more grounded in history and civilization; pluralities in Kuwait (47%), UAE (44%), and Bahrain (41%) agree. More

than one third of respondents in Bahrain (39%), Kuwait (36%), and UAE (33%) say Iranian culture is more grounded in history and civilization. In Kuwait and Bahrain, Shia and Sunni respondents are divided on this question.

Finally, in all the Gulf region countries surveyed, majorities of respondents say Iranian culture is more violent. Again, in Kuwait, a plurality of Shia respondents (47%) and about a third of Bahraini Shia respondents say Arab culture is more violent.

<u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine</u>

Compare Arab culture	with Iranian culture in the followin	ıg ways:			
Table 10		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
****** 1 ·	Arab Culture	59	75	66	75
Which is more generous?	Iranian Culture	12	0	12	6
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	28	22	19	14
Which is more violent?	Arab Culture	2	32	8	6
	Iranian Culture	92	52	79	82
violent.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	5	12	9	11
¥471 • 1 •	Arab Culture	76	56	66	74
Which is more knowledgeable?	Iranian Culture	9	9	11	9
Knowieugeable.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	14	33	17	12
Which is more	Arab Culture	80	55	55	72
grounded in history	Iranian Culture	6	8	17	8
and civilization?	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	12	33	22	16

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)** 

Compare Arab cultur	e with Iranian culture in the follow	ving ways:				
Table 10		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
***** 1 .	Arab Culture	64	55	60	75	75
Which is more generous?	Iranian Culture	10	14	13	0	0
generous.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	26	31	28	22	23
	Arab Culture	3	2	2	1	47
Which is more violent?	Iranian Culture	92	92	91	92	33
violent:	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	4	7	5	2	17
TATE OF THE STATE	Arab Culture	72	80	77	65	51
Which is more knowledgeable?	Iranian Culture	11	10	6	5	11
knowieugeable.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	16	9	16	28	35
Which is more	Arab Culture	76	83	81	59	54
grounded in history	Iranian Culture	5	7	6	6	9
and civilization?	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	15	9	11	28	35

In Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, majorities of respondents say Arab culture is more generous and more knowledgeable. Respondents in these countries also agree that Arab culture is more grounded in

history and civilization and that Iranian culture is more violent. In Iraq, 52% of respondents overall say Iranian culture is more violent, with 92% of Sunni respondents saying this, while 47% of Shia respondents say Arab culture is more violent and 33% say Iranian culture is more violent.

Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Compare Arab cultur	e with Iranian culture in the followi	ng ways:					
Table 10		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Which is more generous?	Arab Culture	81	78	68	74	82	75
	Iranian Culture	5	7	2	15	4	10
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	14	14	25	9	13	14
Which is more violent?	Arab Culture	6	10	37	9	8	8
	Iranian Culture	86	77	35	77	81	79
violent.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	7	13	24	11	11	10
TA71 • 1 •	Arab Culture	70	58	38	60	69	66
Which is more knowledgeable?	Iranian Culture	14	26	16	22	16	18
Knowieugeable.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	14	15	39	14	15	15
Which is more	Arab Culture	76	76	29	65	83	71
grounded in history	Iranian Culture	8	13	52	20	8	17
and civilization?	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	16	9	13	10	8	11

More than two-thirds of the respondents from the North African countries surveyed say Arab culture is more generous. Majorities in Morocco (70%), Egypt (69%), Sudan (66%), Tunisia (60%), and Algeria (58%) say Arab culture is more knowledgeable. In Libya, 38% say Arab culture is more knowledgeable, while 39% say Arab and Iranian culture are equal. At least two-thirds of respondents in all the countries except Libya say Arab culture is more grounded in history and civilization, while a majority in Libya (52%) says Iranian culture is more grounded in history and civilization. Finally, more than three-quarters of respondents in all the North African nations surveyed except Libya say Iranian culture is more violent. Only 35% of Libyan respondents agree that Iranian culture is more violent, while 37% say Arab culture is more violent and 24% say the two cultures are equally violent.

<u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Compare Arab culture with I	ranian culture in the following ways.	:		
Table 10		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
	Arab Culture	77	45	85
Which is more generous?	Iranian Culture	8	11	1
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	11	41	12
Which is more violent?	Arab Culture	7	9	7
	Iranian Culture	81	56	81
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	9	29	11
*	Arab Culture	77	62	75
Which is more knowledge- able?	Iranian Culture	11	12	9
auic:	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	10	23	14
*******	Arab Culture	84	63	88
Which is more grounded in history and civilization?	Iranian Culture	7	5	3
mistory and civilization:	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	5	27	7

**Group IV - Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Compare Arab cultur	e with Iranian culture in the follov	ving way	s:				
Table 10		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
TATILLI	Arab Culture	83	38	44	49	90	84
Which is more generous?	Iranian Culture	4	34	11	12	0	2
	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	9	27	41	39	9	13
	Arab Culture	6	13	9	8	5	8
Which is more violent?	Iranian Culture	83	70	56	59	88	79
violent.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	9	12	29	27	7	13
X171 · 1 ·	Arab Culture	81	47	62	61	85	71
Which is more knowledgeable?	Iranian Culture	6	38	12	12	3	12
Knowiedgeable.	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	9	13	23	23	10	15
Which is more	Arab Culture	87	66	64	61	92	86
grounded in history	Iranian Culture	5	20	4	9	2	4
and civilization?	Arab & Iranian culture are equal	4	9	27	27	4	8

Majorities in Azerbaijan (85%) and Turkey (77%) believe that Arab culture is more generous; 45% of Pakistani respondents agree, while 41% say Arab and Iranian culture are equally generous. Majorities in all three countries agree that Arab culture is more knowledgeable, that Arab culture is more grounded in history and civilization, and that Iranian culture is more violent.

## 11. IRAN AS A NUCLEAR POWER

**Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen** 

Which of the following statements comes close	Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?									
Table 11	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen			
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	97	78	92	80	89	80	33			
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	3	15	4	12	10	11	61			

### Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Which of the following	Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?													
Table 11	Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	•	UAE Sunni	UAE Shia			Oman Sunni		Oman Ibadi		Yemen Shia
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	100	94	95	63	94	80	82	100	30	96	69	74	41	19
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	0	6	3	25	2	12	13	0	61	2	28	13	53	76

More than three-quarters of respondents in Kuwait (97%), Qatar (92%), Saudi Arabia (89%), Oman (80%), UAE (80%), and Bahrain (78%) say that the "Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone, while 61% of respondents in Yemen disagree, saying that the "Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power." The Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia and Yemen are alone in favoring Iran becoming a nuclear power (61% and 76%, respectively).

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine** 

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?									
Table 11	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine					
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	70	48	89	79					
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	26	49	8	19					

**Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)** 

Which of the following statements comes clos	Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?									
Table 11	Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia					
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	86	29	91	76	35					
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	9	67	8	20	63					

In Jordan (89%), Palestine (79%), and Lebanon (70%), respondents overwhelmingly feel that the region is more secure without nuclear weapons. In Iraq, however, respondents are evenly split on this question (48% vs. 49%), and this division is largely on sectarian lines with 76% of Sunni respondents siding with a nuclear free zone and 63% of Shia respondents in favor of a nuclear Iran. Two-thirds of Shia respondents in Lebanon also favor Iran becoming a nuclear power, while Lebanese Sunni (86%) and Christians (91%) strongly support a nuclear free Middle East.

#### Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?								
Table 11	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan		
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	59	54	38	78	73	73		
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	41	46	55	18	25	26		

A majority of respondents in Tunisia (78%), Egypt (73%), Sudan (73%), Morocco (59%), and Algeria (54%) think that a nuclear free Middle East is more secure, while a majority of Libyan respondents (55%) say Middle East security is better served by a nuclear Iran. In Morocco and Algeria, more than four in ten respondents agree that the Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.

#### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?									
Table 11	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan						
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	82	85	86						
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	14	11	12						

**Group IV - Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Which of the following statements comes clos	Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?									
Table 11	Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia				
Statement A: The Middle East would be more secure if it were a nuclear free zone.	89	34	92	52	96	82				
Statement B: The Middle East would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.	6	62	4	45	2	16				

More than eight in ten respondents in Azerbaijan (86%), Pakistan (85%), and Turkey (82%) say that the Middle East is more secure without nuclear weapons. A majority of Shia respondents in Turkey (62%), as well as 45% of Shia respondents in Pakistan, feel that the region would be more secure if Iran were a nuclear power.

## 12. IRAN'S POWER IN THE GULF REGION

<u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen</u>

Agree or disagree with the fo	ollowing statements	s?						
Table 12		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	98	82	94	83	97	84	66
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	1	12	4	12	2	8	33
I would be comfortable with Iran as the domi-	Agree	14	30	3	10	15	13	62
nant power in the Gulf region	Disagree	79	65	95	88	81	81	37

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Agree or disagre	e with the	followi	ng state	ments?											
Table 12		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
The Arab Gulf states are right to be con- cerned with Iran's nuclear	Agree	100	96	92	76	97	83	85	99	87	95	93	77	63	70
program because this program only makes the re- gion less secure	Disagree	0	3	5	16	1	11	9	0	11	4	3	12	36	30
I would be comfortable	Agree	3	28	2	58	1	9	14	0	98	3	33	15	52	80
with Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf region	Disagree	93	61	98	34	97	89	85	96	0	96	64	77	46	19

At least two-thirds of respondents in Gulf region countries—with some approaching unanimity (e.g., Kuwait: 98% and Saudi Arabia: 97%)—agree that "Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned with Iran's nuclear program because this program makes the region less secure."

About two-thirds or more of respondents in all the Gulf region states except Yemen would not be comfortable with Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf region. In Yemen, 62% of respondents would be comfortable with this. While majorities of the Shia communities in Saudi Arabia (98%), Yemen (80%), and Bahrain (58%) are comfortable with the idea of Iran as the dominant power in their region, only 28% of Shia respondents in Kuwait and 14% of those in UAE feel comfortable with this.

#### Group II - Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine

Agree or disagree with the following statements?					
Table 12		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	18	32	89	83
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	81	65	10	15
I would be comfortable with Iran as the domi-	Agree	74	62	8	14
nant power in the Gulf region	Disagree	25	35	91	84

#### <u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Agree or disagree with the following statements?						
Table 12		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	28	8	18	72	14
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	71	92	80	26	83
I would be comfortable with Iran as the domi-	Agree	58	93	71	6	89
nant power in the Gulf region	Disagree	40	6	28	91	8

While respondents in Jordan and Palestine overwhelmingly agree that the Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned with Iran's nuclear program (89% and 83%, respectively), just 18% of Lebanese and 32% of Iraqis express this concern. In Iraq, there is a deep divide between Sunni and Shia on this question with 72% of Iraqi Sunni respondents saying this concern is justified and 83% of Shia respondents saying they disagree.

While 74% in Lebanon and 62% in Iraq are comfortable with Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf region, 91% in Jordan and 84% in Palestine are not comfortable with this notion. Again, Iraqis are deeply divided along sectarian lines.

## <u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

Agree or disagree with the following statements?							
Table 12		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	82	63	83	80	73	85
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	17	36	13	17	23	13
I would be comfortable with Iran as the domi-	Agree	27	46	12	15	28	29
nant power in the Gulf region	Disagree	73	53	83	82	72	68

Majorities in all the North African countries surveyed agree with the Gulf region states who are concerned with Iran's nuclear program, with the highest level of agreement in Sudan (85%), Libya (83%), and Morocco (82%).

Majorities of respondents in these countries are also uncomfortable with the idea of Iran as the dominant power in the Gulf region. Those in Libya (83%) and Tunisia (82%) are most uncomfortable; however, only 53% of those in Algeria express discomfort with this idea, while 46% of Algerians are comfortable with Iran as the dominant Gulf power.

#### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Agree or disagree with the following statements?				
Table 12		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	80	75	92
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	15	21	7
I would be comfortable with Iran as the dominant	Agree	15	24	12
power in the Gulf region	Disagree	77	69	87

## **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)**

Agree or disagree with the following statements?							
Table 12		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
The Arab Gulf states are right to be concerned	Agree	87	39	87	14	98	90
with Iran's nuclear program because this program only makes the region less secure	Disagree	8	58	12	67	1	9
I would be comfortable with Iran as the dominant	Agree	9	54	12	87	2	15
power in the Gulf region	Disagree	84	37	81	11	97	83

Respondents in Azerbaijan (92%), Turkey (80%), and Pakistan (75%) agree with the concern of Arab Gulf states about Iran's nuclear program; however, majorities of Shia respondents in Turkey (58%) and Pakistan (67%) disagree with this concern. In Azerbaijan, there is no sectarian division on this question.

At least two-thirds of respondents in Azerbaijan (87%), Turkey (77%), and Pakistan (69%) are not comfortable with Iran as the dominant Gulf power. Again, majorities of Shia in Pakistan (87%) and Turkey (54%) are comfortable with a dominant Iran in the Gulf region, while there is little sectarian division in Azerbaijan.

## 13. IRAN'S MOTIVATIONS

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?											
Table 13	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen				
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	19	22	12	17	4	20	36				
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	72	72	84	78	95	73	59				

## <u>Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)</u>

Which of the following	ng stater	nents co	mes clos	est to you	ır view	s?								
Table 13	Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni			Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	19	20	6	36	10	16	23	1	21	8	6	29	29	48
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	77	74	90	57	86	79	70	99	73	90	90	62	68	45

Majorities in all the Gulf region states surveyed believe that "Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons," with the strongest opinions in Saudi Arabia (95%) and Qatar (84%). Yemeni respondents are the most likely to believe that "Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes" (36%).

### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine**

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?				
Table 13	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	80	12	11	8
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	18	85	87	90

### <u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?					
Table 13	Lebanon Sunni		Lebanon Christian	•	Iraq Shia
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	83	69	86	6	14
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	13	31	12	92	82

While those in Palestine (90%), Jordan (87%), and Iraq (85%) overwhelmingly believe that Iran hopes to build nuclear weapons, 80% of Lebanese respondents say that Iran's nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Lebanon is the only country of the 20 surveyed where a majority expresses this belief.

#### Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?						
Table 13	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	32	28	49	17	15	21
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	68	71	45	81	85	75

In North Africa, more than two-thirds of respondents in Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, and Morocco believe that Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons. In Libya, opinion is split with 49% saying Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and 45% saying Iran wants to produce nuclear weapons.

#### **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan**

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?			
Table 13	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	8	25	7
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	87	69	90

## **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)**

Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?						
Table 13	Turkey	Turkey	Pakistan	Pakistan	Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan
Table 13	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Statement A: Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful	5	28	25	2.3	0	10
purposes.					0	10
Statement B: Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	90	65	69	71	97	88

In Azerbaijan (90%), Turkey (87%), and Pakistan (69%), respondents strongly believe that Iran has ambitions to build nuclear weapons.

## 14. IF IRAN PERSISTS WITH NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen

Agree or disagree with each of the following action	s?							
Table 14		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
If Iran persists with nuclear program, interna-	Agree	57	52	65	54	77	50	18
tional community must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	39	43	28	39	20	43	81
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international	Agree	19	32	25	30	32	22	13
community must authorize military action	Disagree	79	61	66	59	61	72	84
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the interna-	Agree	49	46	20	35	46	37	81
tional community should do nothing	Disagree	49	49	73	55	49	56	20

Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Agree or disagre	e with eac	ch of the	followin	ig action.	s?										
Table 14		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni	Oman Shia	Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
If Iran persists with nuclear program, inter- national com-	Agree	60	55	87	20	69	57	34	97	3	76	56	36	25	8
munity must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	37	40	8	75	24	37	56	1	94	20	42	56	75	92
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international	Agree	29	7	67	1	27	33	1	76	0	46	0	13	20	2
community must authorize military action	Disagree	68	92	21	96	63	57	86	19	100	45	95	82	76	97
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the	Agree	45	53	5	85	17	32	76	1	98	22	52	42	73	93
international community should do nothing	Disagree	53	44	90	9	77	61	5	95	0	73	45	49	27	6

Majorities of respondents in all the Gulf region states except Yemen support economic sanctions against Iran by the international community if Iran persists with its nuclear program. Saudi Arabia (77%) and Qatar (65%) have the strongest levels of support for sanctions, while the margins are closer in UAE (54% vs. 39%), Bahrain (52% vs. 43%), and Oman (50% vs. 43%). In Yemen, 81% of respondents do not support economic sanctions, while just 18% do support them.

However, less than a third of respondents in all Gulf region countries surveyed agree that the international community should authorize military action if Iran continues to resist. When asked if the international community should do nothing in the face of Iranian resistance to efforts to curb its nuclear program, only a majority in Yemen (81%) agree definitively. On the other hand, respondents disagree with the international community doing nothing in Qatar (73%), Oman (56%), and UAE (55%). Opinion is evenly split in Kuwait (49% vs. 49%), Bahrain (46% vs. 49%), and Saudi Arabia (46% vs. 49%).

With respect to these questions, respondents in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are deeply divided along sectarian lines, with the Shia community in both countries strongly opposed to sanctions (Bahrain: 75%, Saudi Arabia: 94%), opposed to military action (Bahrain: 96%, Saudi Arabia: 100%), and supportive of the international community doing nothing (Bahrain: 85%, Saudi Arabia: 98%). On the other hand, a majority of Sunni respondents in Bahrain (67%) and Saudi Arabia (76%) would support the authorization of military action by the international community if Iran continues its nuclear program.

#### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine**

Agree or disagree with each of the following actions?					
Table 14		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
If Iran persists with nuclear program, international com-	Agree	17	29	70	69
munity must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	82	69	26	26
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international commu-	Agree	9	6	36	47
nity must authorize military action	Disagree	89	91	59	47
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the international com-	Agree	79	80	23	24
munity should do nothing	Disagree	17	18	72	73

#### <u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following actions?						
Table 14		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
If Iran persists with nuclear program, international com-	Agree	29	8	16	78	5
munity must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	71	91	84	19	92
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international community	Agree	16	4	8	16	2
must authorize military action	Disagree	83	94	91	82	96
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the international com-	Agree	70	88	79	54	92
munity should do nothing	Disagree	26	6	18	45	5

Jordanians and Palestinians are supportive of economic sanctions if Iran persists with its nuclear program (70% and 69%, respectively), while those in Lebanon and Iraq strongly disagree with sanctions (82% and 69%, respectively). Iraqi Sunni respondents, however, strongly support sanctions (78%), while the Iraqi Shia community strongly opposes this strategy (92%).

Military action authorized by the international community is overwhelmingly opposed by those in Lebanon (89%) and Iraq (91%); a majority in Jordan (59%) also opposes a military response. Palestinians are, however, evenly divided on this question (47% vs. 47%).

Respondents in Lebanon and Iraq are in agreement that the international community should do nothing if Iran continues to resist pressure to curb its nuclear program (79% and 80%, respectively), while more than seven in ten respondents in Jordan and Palestine disagree with a do-nothing strategy.

#### <u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following actions?							
Table 14		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
If Iran persists with nuclear program, international com-	Agree	29	37	29	60	60	62
munity must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	70	63	66	39	39	37
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international commu-	Agree	27	26	13	33	34	37
nity must authorize military action	Disagree	72	72	82	62	64	62
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the international com-	Agree	50	60	63	34	34	36
munity should do nothing	Disagree	50	38	32	64	65	63

Majorities in Sudan (62%), Egypt (60%), and Tunisia (60%) support economic sanctions, while majorities disagree with this strategy in Morocco (70%), Libya (66%), and Algeria (63%). Military action is, however, opposed by strong majorities in all the North African countries surveyed. Doing nothing is not acceptable to majorities in Egypt (65%), Tunisia (64%), and Sudan (63%), but is considered the correct course by majorities in Libya (63%) and Algeria (60%). Moroccans are split on this question (50% vs. 50%).

#### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Agree or disagree with each of the following actions?				
Table 14		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
If Iran persists with nuclear program, international com-	Agree	68	49	77
munity must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	26	45	20
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international commu-	Agree	49	28	50
nity must authorize military action	Disagree	46	66	47
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the international com-	Agree	24	42	17
munity should do nothing	Disagree	73	52	81

**Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)** 

Agree or disagree with each of the following action	1s?						
Table 14		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
If Iran persists with nuclear program, interna-	Agree	78	8	56	9	93	71
tional community must apply economic sanctions against Iran	Disagree	16	87	38	86	5	26
If Iran continues to resist efforts, international	Agree	56	3	34	0	61	46
community must authorize military action	Disagree	39	92	61	93	36	51
If Iran continues to resist efforts, the interna-	Agree	14	88	32	93	1	23
tional community should do nothing	Disagree	84	8	62	1	97	75

Respondents in Azerbaijan (77%) and Turkey (68%) are supportive of economic sanctions if Iran persists with its nuclear program. Opinion in Pakistan in divided on this question (49% vs. 45%). In both Pakistan and Turkey, views are divided by sect with the Shia communities strongly opposing sanctions (Turkey: 87%, Pakistan: 86%).

Two-thirds of Pakistani respondents oppose military action if Iran continues to resist, while opinion is split in Azerbaijan (50% support vs. 47% oppose) and Turkey (49% vs. 46%). A majority of Sunni respondents in both Azerbaijan (61%) and Turkey (56%) actually support a military response to continued Iranian resistance.

Finally, a non-response by the international community is opposed by majorities in all three of these non-Arab Muslim neighbors (Azerbaijan: 81%, Turkey: 73%, Pakistan: 52%). Again, these responses are deeply divided along sectarian lines in Turkey and Pakistan; 88% of Turkish Shia respondents and 93% of Pakistani Shia respondents agree with a do-nothing response from the international community.

## 15. SUPPORT MILITARY STRIKES IF...

**Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen** 

Support military strikes if								
Table 15		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's nuclear facilities &	Support	17	36	28	29	36	19	12
authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	82	60	64	65	60	74	87
Would you support military strikes if in-	Support	12	11	12	23	11	10	12
dividual countries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	86	85	83	73	85	83	83

### Group I – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, KSA, Oman, Yemen (religion)

Which of the following	ng statem	ents con	nes clos	est to you	ır views?										
Table 15		Kuwait Sunni	Kuwait Shia	Bahrain Sunni	Bahrain Shia	-					Oman Sunni		Oman Ibadi	Yemen Sunni	Yemen Shia
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's	Support	30	1	75	2	30	32	1	70	0	38	7	12	18	3
nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	69	98	22	94	61	62	97	27	100	53	84	82	82	94
Would you sup- port military strikes if individual	Support	18	4	22	0	13	25	3	44	0	22	3	5	19	1
countries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	78	95	71	97	82	71	93	42	99	62	84	94	74	98

Majorities in all the Gulf region states surveyed oppose military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities if authorized by a consensus vote in the United Nations, with the highest level of opposition in Yemen (87%) and Kuwait (82%). The lowest levels of opposition are in Saudi Arabia (60%) and Bahrain (60%), where majorities of Sunni respondents support such strikes (Saudi Arabia: 70%, Bahrain: 75%). The opposition to military strikes by individual countries is even stronger in all countries. The sectarian division is considerably less pronounced in Saudi Arabia (44% of Sunni support) and Bahrain (only 22% of Sunni support) with respect to individual countries' conducting military strikes.

#### **Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine**

Support military strikes if					
Table 15		Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's	Support	10	11	34	45
nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	89	87	57	51
Would you support military strikes if individual countries	Support	2	7	17	20
conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	98	89	77	75

### <u>Group II – Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (religion)</u>

Support military strikes if						
Table 15		Lebanon Sunni	Lebanon Shia	Lebanon Christian	Iraq Sunni	Iraq Shia
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's	Support	15	5	9	29	1
nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	83	94	90	66	97
Would you support military strikes if individual coun-	Support	3	1	2	22	1
tries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	97	99	97	74	97

Respondents in Lebanon and Iraq overwhelmingly oppose UN-sanctioned military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities (89% and 87%, respectively), while just majorities oppose such strikes in Jordan (57%) and Palestine (51%). Opposition in all four countries is more intense with respect to military strike by individual countries, from 98% in Lebanon to 75% in Palestine.

<u>Group III – Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan</u>

Support military strikes if							
Table 15		Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's	Support	26	26	13	33	39	36
nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	72	73	82	63	60	63
Would you support military strikes if individual coun-		22	23	2	25	39	30
tries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	75	73	89	73	61	63

Opposition to military strikes is strong, and basically the same regardless of UN authorization, among the North African countries surveyed. The strongest opposition is in Libya, where 82% are opposed to UN approved strikes and 89% to individual countries' strikes. The highest level of support for strikes is in Egypt, where 39% support strikes with or without UN authorization.

### <u>Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan</u>

Support military strikes if				
Table 15		Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
Would you support military strikes if used against Iran's	Support	51	29	50
nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	45	65	47
Would you support military strikes if individual coun-	Support	52	24	49
tries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	45	66	47

## **Group IV – Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan (religion)**

Support military strikes if							
Table 15		Turkey Sunni	Turkey Shia	Pakistan Sunni	Pakistan Shia	Azerbaijan Sunni	Azerbaijan Shia
Would you support military strikes if used against	Support	56	15	34	6	60	45
Iran's nuclear facilities & authorized by a consensus vote in UN	Oppose	40	81	60	88	37	51
Would you support military strikes if individual	Support	58	15	26	18	59	45
countries conduct them against Iran's nuclear facilities	Oppose	39	81	66	66	37	50

Two-thirds of Pakistani respondents are opposed to military strikes with or without UN authorization. However, a majority of respondents in Turkey support strikes in both scenarios and respondents in Azerbaijan are basically split on military strikes; in both countries majorities of Sunni respondents support military strikes with or without UN authorization.

## **DEMOGRAPHICS**

		Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	UAE	KSA	Oman	Yemen	Lebanon	Iraq	Jordan	Palestine	Morocco	Algeria	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Sudan	Turkey	Pakistan	Azerbaijan
der	Male	62.1	64	49.3	49.5	57.2	57.1	50.2	47.6	50.8	51.4	51.5	48.5	50.2	51.5	50.4	50.5	50.7	50.3	51.7	47.7
Gender	Female	37.9	36	50.7	50.5	42.8	42.9	49.8	52.4	49.2	48.6	48.5	51.5	49.8	48.5	49.6	49.5	49.3	49.7	48.3	52.3
_	Sunni	56	46.9	93.3	90.7	84.2	30	62.3	30.5	32.1	93	98.5	99.6	99.4	98.9	99	88.3	99	82.9	83.7	28
gior	Shia	44	49.3	6.7	8.5	15.6	10	37.2	30.5	67.9	1.9	0	0.4	0.6	1.1	0.5	0.5	0.9	14	16.3	72
Religion	Christian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	39	0	5.1	1.5	0	0	0	0.5	11.2	0.1	2.5	0	0
	Other answers	0	3.8	0	0.8	0.2	60	0.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6	0	0

#### **METHODOLOGY**

The approach used for conducting the poll in the 20 Muslim countries involved face to face, in-home personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative & comprised adult males and females, who were 15+ years of age (in some GCC countries, only citizens were covered).

### Sampling

The proposed coverage in each of the countries was as indicated below:

Country	Sample	Coverage
KSA	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	Only Emiratis	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Kuwait	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Farwaniya, Andalus, Fardous, Kuwait City, Jabriya, Hawalli, Mubarak Al Kabir
Bahrain	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Manama, Muharraq, Al Riffa, Madinat Isa, Hammad, Sitra, Al Gharbiyah
Qatar	Only Qataris	Ad Doha, Ar Rayan, Al Wakrah, Adh Dhakirah, Umm Salal Muhammad, Shahaniyah, At- Turiyah, Ghuwayriyah, Madinat Al Shamal
Oman	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Muscat, Salalah, Nizwa, Sohar, Sur, Buraymi, Sib, Khasab
Lebanon	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Palestine	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Gaza, Deir Al Balah, Khan Younis, Beit Hanoun, Gabalia, Rafah, Al Quds, Nablus, Janin, Bethlehem, Al Khalil, Tulkarm, Ramallah
Iraq	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymani- yah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana,Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
Egypt	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
Morocco	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Casablanca, Marrakech, Fes, Meknes, Rabat, Kenitra, Tanger, Oujda
Algeria	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Algiers, Tiziouzou, Setif, Constantine, Oran, Chlef, Biskra, Ouargla, Annaba, El Taref, Saida, Adrar
Tunisia	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Tunis, Bizerte, Ariane, Carthage, Sidi Thabet, Megrine, Sousse, Sfax, Rural Kairouan, Gaafsa, Rural Hergla, Belkhir
Libya	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Derna, Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Misrata, Tripoli, Azawyia, Yefren, Nalut, Sabha
Sudan	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Khartoum, Omdurman, Wad Madani, Khartoum Bahary, Al Abyad, Bur Sudan, Al Fashir, Port Sudan, Kusti, Al Manaqel, Nyala
Yemen	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Sanaa, Bani Hashish, Aden, Shaqra, Al Hudaydah, Bajel, Taizz, Al Ramada, Al Mukalla, Al Rayan, Ibb, Marab
Pakistan	Adults 15+ yrs, Nationally Representative	Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Peshawar, Mardan, Quetta, Hub, Saidpur



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